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William R. Ezzell  
11 U. MASS. L. REV 194 
ABSTRACT 
This Article tells the legal story of one of the South’s most infamous trials – the 
Groveland Boys prosecution in central Florida. Called “Florida’s Little Scottsboro,” 
the Groveland case garnered international attention in 1949 when four young black 
men were accused of the gang rape of a white woman in the orange groves north of 
Orlando. Several days of rioting, Ku Klux Klan activity, three murders, two trials, 
and three death penalty verdicts followed, in what became the most infamous trial in 
Florida history. The appeals of the trial reached the United States Supreme Court, 
with the NAACP’s Thurgood Marshall serving as lead defense counsel in the re-trial 
of the case. The case reads like a Hollywood movie, but with the underpinnings of a 
classic 20th century southern courtroom drama. 
This Article looks not only at the history of the Groveland prosecutions, but 
undertakes a legal analysis of the trial court decisions made by the trial judge. While 
the historiographical narrative of the Groveland trials is one of racism and a “legal 
lynching,” many of the legal decisions made by the trial court were, in fact, 
surprisingly consistent with legal precedent of the time. Nevertheless, the tragic 
outcome of the Groveland case inflicted a permanent scar on the reputation of the 
Florida criminal justice system. 
AUTHOR NOTE 
The author is a 2002 law school graduate of the University of Alabama, and has 
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office’s Sex Crimes and Special Victims’ Unit. The author would like to thank his 
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The case presents one of the best examples of one 
of the worst menaces to American justice.1 
 
n July 16, 1949, on a desolate road in rural central Florida, a 
white woman claimed she was raped by four black men. Norma 
Lee Padgett and her husband Willie Haven Padgett were driving on 
Florida State Road 50 towards Groveland, Florida, having come from 
a dance in Clermont, when Willie stopped the car on a deserted stretch 
of darkened road, surrounded by the orange groves of Lake County. 
The truth of what happened next will forever remain one of Florida’s 
greatest legal mysteries. According to Willie and Norma Lee, the 
couple began experiencing car troubles, and four black men stopped to 
help them. Allegedly, the men overpowered Willie and drove off into 
the groves with Norma Lee. When they stopped the car at a secluded 
location, each of the four men took turns raping Norma Lee in the 
backseat of their car, at gunpoint. When they had finished, she 
claimed, the four men drove off, leaving her to wander through the 
orange trees until she found help. The national and international press 
called the “crime”2 that Norma and Willie concocted3 a farce.4 Locals 
called it the worst crime in Lake County’s history.5 In the wake of the 
allegations came riots, burnings, trials, appeals, and murders. 
In spite of its front-page news status, for nearly 65 years the story 
of the Groveland Boys has been a story as much in search of a voice, 
as it has been a story in search of the truth. Perhaps kept out of the 
limelight by a state overly concerned with its tourist image, and only 
covered sparingly by historians 6  and journalists. 7  Florida’s most 
                                                
1 Shepherd v. Florida, 31 U.S. 50, 55 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
2 James W. Ivey, Florida’s Little Scottsboro: Groveland, 56 CRISIS 266, 268 
(1949) (quotation marks used by the original source). 
3 See id. at 285-86 (explaining local suspicion centered around the rumor that 
Norma Lee and Willie Padgett created this rape story to hide the fact that Willie 
had battered Norma Lee; or to hide the fact that Norma Lee had been having a 
sexual affair with a black man). 
4 Ramona Lowe, Judge Whittles as Three Fight Death, CHI. DEFENDER, Sept. 10, 
1949, at 3. 
5 Mabel Norris-Reese, The True ‘Groveland Story’ Will be Told in This Week’s 
Life, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, July 28, 1949, at 1. 
6 See generally BEN GREEN, BEFORE HIS TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HARRY T. 
MOORE, AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MARTYR. (Free Press 1999); GILBERT 
KING, THE DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND 
BOYS, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA (Harper Perennial 2012). 
O 
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sensational trial has yet to be analyzed through a legal lens. Even after 
two trials and two appeals, the majority opinion in the United States 
Supreme Court’s only review of the Groveland matter consists of just 
eight words.8 This Article seeks to step past the Bar and look behind 
the Bench at this truly remarkable legal drama. It can hardly be said 
that the sad results of the Groveland trials were surprising. No doubt, 
these defendants were foredoomed.9 To that end, this Article does not 
attempt to make any further social, moral, or political comment on the 
embarrassing depravities of a legal system based on the white 
supremacy of central Florida in 1949. Such works undoubtedly exist in 
deservedly countless numbers based on similar cases and locations 
throughout the American South. Rather, this Article attempts to 
examine the legal rulings, strategic motivations, procedural rules, and 
court precedents in place at the time of these trials, to bring to light the 
failures and successes of the lawyers and judges involved in this 
matter. Contrary to modern conventional wisdom, the majority of the 
rulings made by the trial judge in the case of the Groveland Boys—
whether motivated by legal acumen, racism, justice, or luck—proved 
to be correct under the law of the day. While many of these rulings 
would not stand the test of time or our current understandings of 
justice and race relations, they were, in their time, correct. It is to these 
applications of the law, many of which may sting the modern legal ear, 
that we now turn our attention. 
PART I: THE CASE 
The Groveland Trouble 
Modern writers say the Groveland trouble was about citrus – not 
race, or sex.10 An all-black town11 in Lake County, Florida, just west 
of Orlando, Groveland was built around a sharecropper mentality 
which had been in place since the end of the Civil War. For wages of 
                                                                                                               
7 See GARY CORSAIR, THE GROVELAND FOUR: THE SAD SAGA OF A LEGAL 
LYNCHING (1st Books 2004). 
8 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 50 (1951) (“Per Curiam. The judgment is 
reversed. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282.”). 
9 Brief for Petitioners at 19, Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1950). 
10 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 110. 
11 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 65 (Per local segregation laws, blacks were not 
permitted to live in the nearby, all white, town of Mascotte, Florida). 
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fifteen cents a day, the white grove owners in Mascotte counted on the 
black citizens of Groveland to pick their citrus crops, fertilize their 
trees, and perform the many hard tasks of maintaining the groves that 
supported the profitable citrus industries of central Florida.12 Whites 
comprised roughly sixty percent of the local population, and they 
tolerated their black neighbors as long as they continued to work in 
white-owned citrus groves. 13  Under this rigid system of racial 
oppression14 few blacks owned their own homes,15 and this de facto 
sharecropper system created a debilitating condition of dependency16 
that cruelly entangled both races. 
In the years following the Second World War, black soldiers 
returned to Groveland only to find it exactly as Jim Crow had left it.17 
Having served in the United States military, and having seen indelible 
examples of racial horrors and harmonies, returning black soldiers 
were considerably less acquiescent to this labor system.18 It was into 
this society that local black residents Walter Irvin and Samuel 
Shepherd returned, following their dishonorable discharges from the 
United States Army and their return from the war in Europe.19 Not 
wanting to work in the orange groves, Irvin and Shepherd tried odd 
jobs in nearby Orlando, strutting the main street of Groveland proudly 
wearing their Army uniforms. Considered uppity, or  smart niggers,20 
                                                
12 Steven F. Lawson et al., Groveland: Florida’s Little Scottsboro, 65 FLA. HIST. 
Q. 1, 2 (1986). 
13 KING, supra note 6, at 96-97 (referencing a study done on the local Lake County 
economy in the wake of the Groveland affair by British economist Terence 
McCarthy). 
14 Lawson, supra note 12, at 1. 
15 See CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 39; see also KING, supra note 6, at 97 (noting that 
Groveland defendant Samuel Shepherd’s father, Henry, was one of the few 
black grove owners in the area—a fact that made the Shepherd family resented 
among local whites). 
16 Lawson, supra note 12, at 2. 
17 Id. at 1. 
18 Id. at 2-3. 
19 Id. at 4. Irvin and Shepherd were court martialed for misappropriation of 
government property, and dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Army.  Id. 
20 See Ivey, supra note 2, at 266 (adding further to the local white community’s 
scorn of Sammie Shepherd, his father was a rare Negro success story in 
Groveland, and he not only owned his own house, but owned his own small 
grove). 
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they were immediately approached by Lake County Sheriff, Willis V. 
McCall and ordered to remove their uniforms and take their places in 
the groves where they belonged.21 They refused. When Norma Lee 
Padgett alleged rape at the hands of four unknown black men on July 
16, 1949, Sheriff McCall already had his two prime suspects in mind, 
and they were quickly arrested. Two other young black men, Charles 
Greenlee and Ernest Thomas, were rumored around town to be 
involved in the popular but illegal lottery games known as bolita or 
Cuba. 22  Sheriff McCall, again seizing an opportunity, arrested 
Greenlee and chased Thomas into a cypress swamp near the Georgia 
border. Once located, Ernest Thomas was shot and killed ’while 
resisting arrest.23 
Lake County, Florida, like much of the American South, adhered 
to a strict paradigm of chivalry, which was viewed as necessary for the 
maintenance of racial control. As Steven F. Lawson, professor of 
history at the University of South Florida and perhaps the leading 
authority on the Groveland story, explains: 
The protection of southern white womanhood justified 
racial control. However questionable in specific cases, 
the word and sexual morality of southern daughters 
were considered equally pure. The fear of rape and the 
threat of menacing blacks provided a potent rationale 
for keeping all Negroes in their subordinate place.24 
Thus, as Gilbert King argues, this southern rape complex had 
nothing to do immediately with sex, but rather an internal southern 
fear that any advancement by the black race, beyond its currently 
limited social situation, might allow blacks to one day advance far 
enough to lay claim to complete equality.25 Following Norma Lee’s 
allegations, southern white womanhood, and the Lake County way of 
life, was under attack. A racial battle whose ferocity would be nearly 
unmatched in American history was about to be waged in Groveland. 
To pursue this racial attack the whites of the Lake County would 
rely on the same justifications their grandfathers relied upon, and the 
                                                
21 Lawson, supra note 12, at 3. 
22 KING, supra note 6, at 114-15. 
23 Id. at 117. 
24 Lawson, supra note 12, at 25. 
25 KING, supra note 6, at 52. 
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same justifications that whites all across the American South had been 
utilizing since the first days that Africans and Europeans shared space 
on this continent. As phrased by Ida B. Wells, the excuse of the 
protection of white womanhood was “used to justify their own [white] 
barbarism.” 26  Thus, beginning the day after Norma Lee Padgett 
claimed rape, insensate, intolerant whites27 from all over Florida and 
the South, brittle with tension and vengeance,28 converged on this little 
“festering bowels”29 in Lake County. Traffic patterns were affected as 
far away as Jacksonville with vehicles bound for Groveland. 30  An 
angry white mob burned black homes in Groveland — including the 
home of Samuel Shepherd’s father31 — and shot into several others. 
Black residents fled to Orlando or took refuge by hiding in the orange 
groves. Over 300 National Guardsmen and the 118th U.S. Army Field 
Artillery Unit were deployed to help quell the three-day reign of terror. 
The leading local paper, The Mount Dora Topic, defended the mobs 
actions by writing, “the mobs didn’t just wantonly burn Negro homes 
in wild vengeance for the crime. No – it was a cunning mob . . . the 
mob burned the homes of a Negro engaged in voodoo, and another 
who ran a Bolita game.”32 When the mob arrived at the Lake County 
Jail in Tavares demanding that the Sheriff hand over the suspects, 
Sheriff McCall hid his prisoners in the groves to prevent what surely 
would have been a lynching. The local press proclaimed Sheriff 
McCall earned a badge of honor for his handling of the mobs.33 The 
                                                
26 DANIELLE L. MCGUIRE, AT THE DARK END OF THE STREET: BLACK WOMEN, 
RAPE, AND RESISTANCE – A NEW HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
FROM ROSA PARKS TO THE RISE OF BLACK POWER,  at xvii (Vintage Books 
2010) (referencing a quote by Ida B. Wells, editor of the Memphis Free Press). 
27 Ivey supra note 2, at 266. 
28 Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.  
29 Ivey supra note 2, at 266. 
30 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 59. 
31 See KING, supra note 6, at 97 (referencing Terence McCarthy’s study indicating 
that the whites of Lake County were less interested in seeking revenge for the 
rape of Norma Padgett than in seeing the demise of ‘all independent colored 
farmers’). 
32 Norris-Reese, supra note 5, at 1. Bolita was a popular lottery game within the 
local black communities that drew much of Sheriff McCall’s wrath because it 
involved illegal gambling.  
33  Mabel Norris-Reese, Honor Will Be Avenged, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, July 21, 
1949, at 4. 
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stories of the violence in Groveland spread quickly, making headlines 
in national and international papers the next day.34 Before the last of 
the house fires had smoldered out, Groveland was already being called 
“the Florida Terror,”35 and “Florida’s Little Scottsboro.”36 
There were no shortages of horrifying comparisons for the national 
media to make. The sad truth of the matter was that Groveland was 
hardly unique. From Elaine, Arkansas to Scottsboro, Alabama, the 
southern race riot, fueled by allegations of black on white rape, was 
tragically common. Historian Danielle McGuire opines that 
“[u]nsubstantiated rumors of black men attacking innocent white 
women sparked almost 50 percent of all race riots in the United States 
between Reconstruction and World War II.”37 To quell these riots, 
there seemed only two options: a lengthy and painful occupation by 
the local National Guard, or a quick trial followed by the imposition of 
the death penalty for the accused. As Gilbert King, the Pulitzer Prize 
winning author of Devil in the Grove writes, “[i]n the South the 
bargain between justice and the public was implicit: an expeditious 
trial with swift punishment by death or else a riot and lynching.”38 
Lynching was a very real concern for the black population of Florida. 
Since 1900, in the decades preceding the Groveland Case, Florida was 
home to the nation’s highest per capita lynching rate. With a rate of 
4.5 deaths by lynching for every 10,000 blacks, Florida’s lynching rate 
was double that of Mississippi and three times greater than that of 
Alabama. 39  With the National Guard already encamped outside 
Groveland, and with an intimate knowledge of Florida’s violent 
tendencies, Sheriff McCall spared the lives of his prisoners and 
prepared to make them available for their expeditious trial.40  In sum, 
                                                
34 See Lawson, supra note 12, at 2. 
35 GREEN, supra note 6, at 7. 
36 “Florida’s Little Scottsboro” references the 1931 Alabama prosecution of nine 
young black boys for the alleged rape of two white women while on a train 
southbound from Chattanooga, Tennessee through the northeastern Alabama 
town of Scottsboro. The trials and appeals of that case have long been 
considered a dark chapter in American race relations, and a widely accepted low 
point in American legal history. See Lawson, supra note 12, at 7. 
37 MCGUIRE, supra note 26, at 22. 
38 KING, supra note 6, at 137. 
39 GREEN, supra note 6, at 45. 
40 GREEN, supra note 6, at 7 (arguing McCall and the local white power machinery 
likely protected the Groveland defendants from lynching because the negative 
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as the British observer Terence McCarthy sadly noted, the Groveland 
Boys were simply being offered up as a legal blood-sacrifice in an 
effort to spare the remainder of the local black community from 
further violence.41 
Spoon-Fed, One-Sided Reporting 
With pens in hand and typewriters in tow, the national and local 
press came to Lake County to cover the events that would comprise 
one of the greatest race trials in American history. The national media 
was represented in Groveland by six major media outlets: The New 
York Times, The Chicago Defender, Time, Life, The Christian Science 
Monitor, and The New Leader. Of these, the articles written in the New 
York Times and The Chicago Defender are of particular importance to 
the historiography of Groveland, but perhaps just as much for their 
authors as for their content. The New York Times had sent its only 
black reporter, Ted Poston, to cover the Groveland story.42 Poston was 
uniquely qualified to cover Groveland, since he had covered the 1931 
trial of the Scottsboro Boys in Alabama, and had himself been a victim 
of blackmail over a false rape allegation in the past. 43  He was 
eventually nominated for the Pulitzer Prize for his articles on 
Groveland.44 Similarly, black journalist Ramona Lowe of The Chicago 
Defender was able to scoop several stories on the Groveland saga 
since she was able to move and interview with relative ease in the 
local black communities. She even rode back and forth to the 
courthouse in the same car as the defense attorneys.45 Gary Corsair, 
author of The Groveland Four: The Sad Saga of a Legal Lynching, 
attributes Lowe’s investigative success to her being viewed by the 
local black communities as a fellow black first, a woman second, and a 
journalist third.46 
                                                                                                               
press in the national media was already having an adverse effect on Florida’s 
tourism industry, and any further violence would only bring increased pressure 
upon the state). 
41 KING, supra note 6, at 98. 
42 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 66. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. at 380. Additionally, New York University later recognized Poston’s work 
on Groveland as one of the top 100 works of journalism of the 20th Century. Id. 
45 KING, supra note 6, at 175. 
46 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 79. 
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Drawing up the battle lines opposite the national media outlets in 
Groveland were the three primary local newspapers: The Mount Dora 
Topic, The Leesburg Commercial, and The Orlando Sentinel.47 The 
local authorities, namely State Attorney Jesse W. Hunter and Sheriff 
McCall, used the Topic and the Commercial as their own private 
trumpets for information on this drama of the South. 48  Not 
surprisingly, many of these stories smacked of spoon-fed, one-sided 
reporting.49 Like the national press, it was the personalities of the local 
writers that drove the stories, and no local press personality was as 
intriguing as the editor of the Mount Dora Topic, Ms. Mabel Norris-
Reese. A northerner by birth, Norris-Reese had emigrated to the South 
in the years before Groveland, but she seemed to be a Southerner at 
heart; she  refused to sit at the media table in the Lake County 
courtroom until the black journalists were forced to move at her 
request and ultimately Judge Truman Futch’s order.50 Like the Times’ 
Poston, however, Norris-Reese’s work was also nominated for the 
Pulitzer Prize.51 
Clay-Eatin’ Crackers 
The Florida Terror was making for big press in 1949, and it would 
make for tragic history as well. Like much of history, distinct 
personalities were at the center of these events, and the Groveland 
story was long on colorful characters. At center stage sat the alleged 
victim and prosecutrix, Norma Lee Padgett. The seventeen year-old 
newlywed daughter of a respected, albeit poor, Lake County citrus 
grower,52 Norma Lee held many secrets inside her slight, blond frame. 
The girl that State Attorney Jesse Hunter referred to as that “poor, old, 
                                                
47 The Mount Dora Topic and The Leesburg Commercial were published as 
weekly papers. The Orlando Sentinel was a daily paper, published under two 
separate titles through the Groveland saga—The Orlando Sentinel, and The 
Orlando Morning Sentinel. The author will use the more common title, The 
Orlando Sentinel, throughout this Article. 
48 Mabel Norris-Reese, Lake County Awaits Governor’s Solemn End to 
Groveland Story, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, May 18, 1950, at 1. 
49 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 79. 
50 See Lowe, supra note 4, at 3 (describing an instance where Norris-Reese refused 
to sit at a table because there were three negroes present). 
51 Lauren Ritchie, It Was Long Past Time to Omit McCall’s Name, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2007, at 1. 
52 See Ivey, supra note 2, at 266. 
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honest cracker girl”53 had married an older man, but married down in 
station. Her husband, Willie Haven Padgett, was of the lowest stratum 
of Southern white society. Referred to even by the Lake County locals 
as a “clay-eatin’ cracker,”54 Willie was prone to alcohol and violence. 
On the date of this offense, the couple was not living together due to 
marital problems.55 It was rumored that domestic violence, infidelity, 
or both were to blame.56 Such rumors of infidelity even came in the 
form of an affair between Norma Lee and Groveland defendant 
Samuel (“Sammie”) Shepherd.57 
Ernest Thomas, a friend of both Samuel Shepherd and Walter 
Irvin, was also in town on the night of July 16, 1949. Thomas was in 
Groveland to work in a local bolita game that night, but he was not 
with Shepherd or Irvin at any point in the evening. He was with 
Charles Greenlee, a sixteen year old from Gainesville who came to 
Groveland to meet Thomas about the bolita game.58  Greenlee was 
never in the area of the alleged rape that night,59 and when Norma Lee 
and Willie had a chance to identify him as one of the assailants, they 
both indicated he was not one of the four.60 Regardless, Greenlee was 
arrested for loitering, and Thomas fled toward the Georgia border. 
Thomas was found by local law enforcement in Madison County, 
Florida and was shot and killed.61 Four different types of ammunition 
were identified in his body. 62  Norma Lee was driven to Madison 
County to identify the deceased suspect. She confirmed Thomas was 
one of the four.63 
Even if Norma Lee had failed to implicate Ernest Thomas, as had 
been the case with Charles Greenlee, it may not have mattered to Lake 
                                                
53 Mabel Norris-Reese, Groveland Story May Give High Court New Decision to 
Make, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Feb. 21, 1952, at 1. 
54 Ivey supra note 2, at 285. 
55 Trial transcript at 311, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to Marion Cty.) 
(on file with author). 
56 KING, supra note 6, at 224-25. 
57 See generally KING, supra note 6, at 35. 
58 Lawson, supra note 12, at 8. 
59 Id. at 15. 
60 Id. at 10. 
61 Id. at 4. 
62 See KING, supra note 6, at 118. 
63 See Lawson, supra note 12, at 4. 
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County Sheriff Willis V. McCall. A good ole boy type sheriff, straight 
out of central casting,64 McCall seemed a precursor of Birmingham’s 
Bull Connor.65 During his twenty-seven year tenure as sheriff of Lake 
County,66 McCall was investigated for civil rights violations thirty-
eight times—but was never convicted of any.67  An FBI informant 
would later confirm McCall was an active member of the Ku Klux 
Klan’s Apopka, Florida Klavern.68 While the national press reviled the 
Lake County sheriff,69 the local press sang his praises. Referencing 
McCall’s involvement in the Groveland case, Mabel Norris-Reese 
wrote that he spent night and day working on the case,70 and “the full 
story of his bravery . . . will never be told.”71  While McCall was 
certainly subject to divergent viewpoints, what was clear was that he 
understood his constituency. McCall had originally made a name for 
himself as a union buster while an agent with the U.S. Agricultural 
Commission, and from his time at the USAC he had developed little 
patience for blacks that chose not to work in the groves. If there was 
one thing McCall perhaps policed more than idle blacks, it was their 
illicit bolita rings.72 So when McCall needed four black suspects to 
firm up Norma Lee Padgett’s rape allegations, the idle and uppity 
Samuel Shepherd and Walter Irvin, and the bolita-involved Charles 
Greenlee and Ernest Thomas, would close the investigation nicely. 
                                                
64 Jonathan L. Entin, Litigation, Political Mobilization and Social Reform: 
Insights from Florida’s Pre-Brown Civil Rights Era, 52 FLA. L. REV. 497, 501 
(Apr. 2000) (reviewing BEN GREEN, BEFORE HIS TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
HARRY T. MOORE, AMERICA’S FIRST CIVIL RIGHTS MARTYR (Free Press 1999)). 
65 GREEN, supra note 6, at 12. 
66 See id. at 51 (explaining that McCall served as sheriff of Lake County from 
1944 to 1972). 
67 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 379. 
68 Id. at 30. 
69 See, e.g., Sheriff McCall Shoots New Victim in Florida, CHI. DEFENDER, June 4, 
1955, at 5. The national press kept Sheriff McCall in the news even three years 
after the end of the Groveland cases with snide headlines such as this one. 
70 Mabel Norris-Reese, Grand Jury Indicts Three Negroes in Groveland Case, 
MOUNT DORA TOPIC, July 21, 1949, at 1. 
71 Mabel Norris-Reese, Our Thanks, Gentlemen, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 
1949, at 4. 
72 KING, supra note 6, at 78. 
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Sheriff McCall’s right hand man was Deputy Sheriff James Yates. 
With front page photos captioned, “He Gets Evidence,”73 and over-
the-top headlines such as “Scotland Yard, Please Don’t Take Our 
Yates,” 74  Yates was highly regarded in the local press for his 
“remarkable police work that put evidence into the hands of the 
State.”75 Not surprisingly, the national press saw him quite differently. 
The most infamous and notably remarkable police work he was 
responsible for was a series of plaster foot-casts taken at the rape scene 
that conclusively linked defendant Walter Irvin to the scene. The 
Groveland defense team strongly suspected the casts were a fake, and 
in a separate 1962 case, Yates was federally indicted for making 
forged plaster foot-casts in order to assist in framing a defendant.76 
The Groveland trials would be prosecuted by the elected State 
Attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit of Florida, the Honorable Jesse 
W. Hunter. Now seventy years old, Hunter had passed the Florida bar 
exam having never attended law school. 77  He was sworn into the 
Florida Bar in 1913, alongside his lifelong friend, Circuit Judge 
Truman Futch.78 The national press called Hunter a tireless, cigarette 
smoking,79 folksy character with a cracker barrel wit.80 He referred to 
the Groveland defendants as “niggers” throughout the course of the 
case. 81  To his friend Mabel Norris-Reese, the editor of the local 
                                                
73 Mabel Norris-Reese, He Gets Evidence, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 1949, at 
1. 
74 Mabel Norris-Reese, Scotland Yard, Please Don’t Take Our Yates, MOUNT 
DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 1949, at 1. Norris-Reese subsequently writes, “Should 
Scotland Yard hear of Deputy Sheriff James L. Yates and his work on ‘the 
Groveland Story,’ then Lake County might be out a deputy.” Id. 
75 Norris-Reese, supra note 71, at 4. 
76 See Jack Greenberg, War Stories: Reflections on Thirty-Five Years with the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 587, 593 (1994). 
77 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 50. 
78 Mabel Norris-Reese, At Long Last, the Groveland Story is Put into Production, 
MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 1949, at 1. 
79 Lowe, supra note 4, at 3.  
80 Lawson, supra note 12, at 17. 
81 Lowe, supra note 4, at 3. 
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weekly newspaper The Mount Dora Topic, the sage and trial trained82 
Hunter, was Lake County’s “Dean of Law.”83 
The defense of the 1949 Groveland Three84 was conducted by Alex 
Akerman, Jr. of Orlando. The only Republican in the Florida 
legislature, Akerman had made his reputation as a civil rights liberal 
when he filed a desegregation lawsuit on behalf of Virgil Hawkins 
against the University of Florida in Gainesville. In sum, he was the 
only white Florida attorney the National Association for the Advance 
of Colored People (NAACP) could find who was willing to accept the 
case.85 
Akerman was assisted in the first Groveland trial by Franklin 
Williams, a black New York lawyer from the NAACP’s Legal 
Defense Fund. Upon stepping foot in the courtroom in Tavares, 
Williams became the first black attorney to practice law in Lake 
County.86 The colored attorney possessed a “clipped northern accent, 
answered questions with a cold hardness, 87  and had a “complete 
bitterness in [his] eyes,” wrote the Topic.88 To the editor of the Topic, 
Williams personified the racial question.89 Under an article featuring 
Williams, the Topic printed a photo on the front page with the 
inexplicable caption, “Was it Hate?” underneath.90 Franklin Williams 
was trying the Groveland cases on enemy soil. 
The biggest trial in Florida history would be tried before the 
Honorable Truman G. Futch, circuit court judge for the fifth judicial 
circuit of Florida. Like his lifelong friend Jesse Hunter, Futch never 
                                                
82 Norris-Reese, supra note 33, at 4. 
83 Mabel Norris-Reese, Elmo Roper May Prove Length of Leaf, But Not Hunter’s 
Ability, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, February 14, 1952, at 1. 
84 The 1949 “Groveland Three” trial in Lake County (Tavares, Florida) involved 
defendants Samuel Shepherd, Walter Irvin, and Charles Greenlee. Defendant 
Ernest Thomas was deceased, but his name still appeared on the indictment. 
85 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 93. 
86 Id. at 105. Williams, a black man without a Florida Bar card, was allowed to 
assist with the case only because State Attorney Hunter asked that his son be 
sworn in as his assistant at the same trial. Id. 
87 Mabel Norris-Reese, Attorney Williams Expresses His Views on ‘Faults of the 
South,’ MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 1949, at 1. 
88 Mabel Norris-Reese, When History Records, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 8, 
1949, at 4. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1. 
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attended law school,91 but he passed the bar exam with Hunter in 1913 
after a self-taught legal education.92 The national press dubbed him 
“The Whittler,” for his incessant practice of whittling fence chips into 
toothpicks during the trial, and Ramona Lowe of The Chicago 
Defender added to the legend with the Nero-esque article headline, 
“Judge Whittles While Three Fight Death.”93 Meanwhile, the local 
press described Futch as at ease on the bench . . . attentive to every 
word, and completely fair and unbiased.94 The transcripts of the trials 
would both refute and acknowledge such praise. 
With the players and press assembled in Tavares, the county seat 
of Lake County, State Attorney Hunter convened a grand jury on July 
20, 1949. In spite of the fact that Norma Lee and Willie Padgett had 
failed to originally implicate Charles Greenlee in this offense, and the 
fact that Ernest Thomas had been killed during his capture in north 
Florida, the four names of Samuel Shepherd, Walter Irvin, Charles 
Greenlee, and Ernest Thomas appeared before a Lake County grand 
jury for indictment on the charge of capital rape. All four indictments 
were returned. Mabel Norris-Reese, editor of The Mount Dora Topic, 
proclaimed that the hasty call of the grand jury “bespeaks of the 
caliber of the county’s law enforcement officers.”95 
With the quick return of the indictments and the setting of a trial 
date just over one month out, the local press went into high gear. The 
harsh pretrial publicity they generated would constitute a major factor 
in the United States Supreme Court’s review of the trial.96 For starters, 
The Leesburg Commercial, using information likely provided by 
Sheriff McCall, ran a story confidently detailing the fact that two of 
the three defendants had confessed while in custody, but failed to 
discuss how these alleged confessions might have been obtained.97 
                                                
91 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 50. 
92 Norris-Reese, supra note 78, at 1. 
93 Lowe, supra note 4, at 3. 
94 Norris-Reese, supra note 71, at 4. 
95 Norris-Reese, supra note 33, at 4. 
96 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951). While the 1949 trial was reversed on 
the basis of the improper selection of the county grand jury under Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950), Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion focused on the 
negative pretrial publicity as an additional and equal ground warranting reversal. 
See 341 U.S. at 50-54. 
97 See Lawson, supra note 12, at 8 (“From a meeting with Irvin, Shepherd, and 
Greenlee [defense attorney Franklin Williams] learned that despite the sheriff’s 
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Having absorbed Lake County’s opening salvo, the Groveland defense 
team responded in kind, mostly to the northern and black press, as 
NAACP attorney Franklin Williams made various impermissible press 
releases of his own.98 Likely a result of ignorance, or perhaps shrewd 
calculation, the Lake County local press began utilizing the full name 
of the rape victim,99 in clear violation of Florida law.100 Seemingly 
skeptical of the formalities of a trial, The Orlando Sentinel wrote, 
“[w]e’ll wait and see what the law does, and if the law doesn’t do it 
right, we’ll do it.”101 Having considerably more confidence in Lake 
County’s brand of justice, Norris-Reese penned an article in The 
Mount Dora Topic on the day after the indictments, entitled “Honor 
Must Be Avenged.” In it she stated, “a sorry thing happened to that 
young couple . . . their honor must be avenged. And it will be. 
Revenge will be accomplished by a more frightening and awful means 
than a mob has at its command.”102 Although the Topic’s reference to 
                                                                                                               
announcement that the accused had admitted their guilt, they had been badly 
beaten by the deputies until they had agreed to confess. Their story was 
corroborated when an examination completed by Williams several days after 
their arrest revealed numerous cuts and bruises all over their bodies . . . 
Jefferson Elliot, [Florida] Governor [Fuller] Warren’s special investigator, told 
him that it was evident from the wounds and scars on Green, Irvin, and 
Shepherd ‘that they had been beaten around the clock.’ Even so, Irvin had 
refused to admit his guilt.”); see also Shepherd, 341 U.S. at 52 (1951) (J. 
Jackson, concurring) (“But neither counsel nor court can control the admission 
of evidence if unproven, and probably unprovable, confessions are put before 
the jury by newspapers and radio. . . It is hard to imagine a more prejudicial 
influence than a press release by the officer of the court charged with the 
defendants’ custody stating that they had confessed, and here just such a 
statement, unsworn to, unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was 
conveyed by the press to the jury.”). 
98 See Answer to Application for Removal of Cause at 2, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 
1952) (removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author). Williams stated the 
defendants were innocent and indicated local racial motives were driving the 
case. Id. 
99 The use of the victim’s full name by the local press may have been a result of 
simple ignorance of the applicable Florida statute, or may have stemmed from a 
desire to educate the potential jury as to the identity of the victim and her family, 
as her family was reasonably well thought of within the community. 
100 FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1949); FLA. STAT. § 794.04 (1949) (declaring the 
publication of a rape victim’s name unlawful, and imposing a misdemeanor of 
the first degree as the sanction). 
101 ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 17, 1949, at 1. 
102 Norris-Reese, supra note 33, at 4. 
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the death penalty might have been (more) subtle, The Orlando Sentinel 
was frighteningly less so when they published a full color, front page 
cartoon of four empty electric chairs and the words, “No Compromise 
– Supreme Penalty.”103 This ill-humored cartoon would form the final 
straw in the United States Supreme Court’s reversal of the Lake 
County tragedy.104 
May God Rest Your Soul 
On September 2, 1949 the trial of the State of Florida versus 
Shepherd, Irvin, Greenlee, and Thomas105  was set to commence in 
Lake County circuit court. As a row of white reporters snapped 
photos—Judge Futch did not allow the black media to take any 
pictures—an all-white, all male Lake County jury heard two days of 
testimony. 106  Although Willie and Norma Lee Padgett’s testimony 
differed on some of the details of the case,107 Norma Lee proved a 
much better witness than the defense had anticipated. Fearing a black 
attorney may be seriously injured or killed if he rose to cross examine 
a white woman in front of a white jury, the NAACP’s legal 
heavyweights of Franklin Williams — and later Thurgood Marshall — 
were sidelined in favor of their white co-counsel. 108  It was the 
relatively inexperienced, but local and white, Alex Akerman, Jr. who 
was given the thankless task of handling the details of the Groveland 
defense. But even as a white attorney, he was greatly limited in his 
ability to put forth a viable defense. From the outset, the defense team 
was significantly hampered by the fact that southern courtroom 
decorum essentially required them to limit their defense to that of 
mistaken identity. The defense team was sadly forced into the 
unenviable position of conceding that Norma Lee Padgett had been 
                                                
103  ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 19, 1949, at 1. 
104 See id.; see also Shepherd, 341 U.S. at 53 (acknowledging that although the 
1949 trial was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court on the basis of improper 
grand jury selection, Justice Robert H. Jackson’s concurring opinion made clear 
he believed such negative pretrial publicity would also have warranted reversal). 
105 Ernest Thomas’ name, although deceased, still appeared on the indictment, the 
court docket, and on the trial transcripts. 
106 Lowe, supra note 4, at 3. 
107 See, e.g., Ivey, supra note 2, at 268. Willie and Norma Lee Padgett differed at 
times on whether there were three or four possible assailants, but as Ivey writes, 
“the white woman had said four, so four it must be.” Id.  
108 KING, supra note 6, at 299. 
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raped — in spite of reasonable evidence to the contrary — and only 
arguing that the defendants were not the true offenders. As Gilbert 
King states, “[t]he defense dared not to question in any way . . . the 
purity of the Flower of Southern Womanhood . . . So the only 
practicable strategy for the defense in the Groveland Boys case was to 
raise reasonable doubt by showing that the state of Florida had arrested 
the wrong men.”109 Raising such a doubt, in such a climate, would 
prove an impossible task. 
The homegrown and folksy State Attorney Jesse Hunter also 
proved a much tougher adversary than the defense team had expected. 
Perhaps his shrewdest legal maneuver of the three year court drama 
was seen in the evidence he did not seek to put in, rather that the 
evidence he did. Namely, when Hunter declined to offer any evidence 
of the defendants’ questionable jailhouse confessions, he cut the legs 
from underneath the defendants’ most anticipated course of argument. 
Namely, the defense team had planned to introduce testimony from a 
Jacksonville doctor and dentist who had examined the defendants at 
Florida State Prison, and who were prepared to testify to the 
substantial amount of torture and physical abuse the defendants had 
suffered while in the custody of the Lake County Sheriff’s Office. 
However, when Hunter astutely decided not to introduce any evidence 
of the confessions, the circumstances surrounding them became legally 
irrelevant. With the law enforcement and medical portions of the trial 
left out, the evidence phase of the capital rape trial of the three 
Groveland defendants would take only two days to complete. 
After the evidence was presented, both sides made their final 
arguments, and when the jury left the courtroom to deliberate Judge 
Futch took Hunter’s hand, shook it, and said, “I have never heard a 
better argument in all my life.”110 Judge Futch was confident in his 
fellow Lake County jurymen, and he knew the defendants were guilty 
when the jury filed out.111 Mabel Norris-Reese noted that even Charles 
Greenlee’s father’s own eyes, showed doubt of his son’s innocence.112 
Verdict form in hand and hardly needing to read it, Judge Futch 
imposed a life sentence upon the juvenile Charles Greenlee, and coldly 
pronounced a sentence of death in the electric chair for Walter Irvin 
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and Samuel Shepherd. In announcing the sentences of the court, Judge 
Futch said simply, “May God rest your soul.”113 
Picking on Very Small Potatoes 
The most publicized trial in Florida history had cost the citizens of 
Lake County upwards of $5,000.00, but the local press proclaimed, the 
county can well be proud of the results.114 The national press saw the 
results differently. Claiming the defense faced virtually every legal 
obstacle imaginable, the national press called the trial “a legal 
lynching” of three innocent men.115 Ramona Lowe of The Chicago 
Defender claimed the proceeding was a trial of gossip led by a white 
supremacist judge, and the only crime committed by the defendants 
was that of being negro.116 Now, Lake County would have to wait and 
see whether the NAACP would derail the plot of the corrupt story by 
use of the appellate process. 117  Lake County’s citizens feared the 
verdict and sentence of September 3, 1949 would hardly be the end of 
the Groveland saga. 
As anticipated, the residents of Lake County did not have to wait 
long to have their fears confirmed. The NAACP quickly announced an 
appeal on behalf of defendants Irvin and Shepherd. The juvenile 
Charles Greenlee decided not to appeal since he did not receive the 
death penalty. On May 16, 1950 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the 
convictions and the headlines in Lake County proclaimed, “Justice 
Triumphs.”118 Justice Roy Chapman, writing for a unanimous Florida 
Supreme Court, said, “the trial showed conclusively that harmony and 
good will existed between the white and colored races.”119 Seizing on 
Justice Chapman’s shortsightedness, Mabel Norris-Reese wrote, “Lake 
County was right, and its accusers wrong . . . the NAACP can now 
leave well enough alone.”120 The NAACP would do no such thing. 
                                                
113 Mabel Norris-Reese, Torch Dies Out for Greenlee as Appeals Are Set For 
Companions, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, Sept. 15, 1949, at 1. 
114 Norris-Reese, supra note 71, at 4. 
115 Ivey, supra note 2, at 268. 
116 Lowe, supra note 4, at 3. 
117 Norris-Reese, supra note 48, at 1. 
118 Mabel Norris-Reese, Justice Triumphs, MOUNT DORA TOPIC, May 18, 1950, at 
4. 
119 Shepherd v. Florida, 46 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 1950). 
120 Norris-Reese, supra note 118, at 4. 
2016 The Law of the Groves 213 
Nearly one year later, on April 9, 1951, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed the convictions in the case of Shepherd v. Florida,121 
and this time the national press took its turn to proclaim Justice in 
Groveland. 122  While the opinion overturned the convictions 
unanimously on the basis of improper grand jury selection procedures, 
Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote a pointed concurring opinion in which 
he argued that improper pretrial publicity in the local press could have 
also constituted a basis for reversal.123 The case was remanded back to 
Lake County, and the national press—using a different label for the 
word victim—exclaimed, “the NAACP has won a new trial for the 
victims of this notorious miscarriage of justice.” 124  The Crisis, a 
magazine published by the NAACP, agreed with Justice Jackson when 
it wrote that the local press played an odious part in preventing a fair 
and impartial trial.125 The Mount Dora Topic, itself a target of Justice 
Jackson’s ire, fired back in an April 12, 1951 article entitled, “Final 
Judging”: 
[The United States Supreme Court] based their 
decision entirely upon transcripts of the trial, upon the 
headlines of newspapers and upon what the defense 
counsel wanted them to know of the case . . . If it is 
wrong for a newspaper to give full coverage to an event 
such as the rape of a woman by four men at the point of 
a gun, then it is wrong for a newspaper to give full 
coverage to the rape of a county by an army of invaders 
at the point of many guns . . . The judges picked on very 
small potatoes . . . [They] should certainly not take 
chances of starting the Civil War over again.126 
A Strange Twist or a Slaughter 
On November 6, 1951, the Groveland story would take a true turn 
for the surreal. The case having now been set for a second trial per the 
Supreme Court’s order, Sheriff Willis McCall was in the process of 
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transporting defendants Walter Irvin and Samuel Shepherd back to the 
Lake County Jail from the Florida State Prison near Starke. Driving 
southbound into Lake County on Florida State Road 19 near the Ocala 
National Forest, Sheriff McCall claimed he suffered a flat tire and 
ordered his two prisoners to change it. Once out of the car, McCall 
states, the two prisoners, handcuffed together, attacked him with a 
flashlight. Acting in self-defense, McCall shot both Irvin and 
Shepherd, and then called Deputy James Yates to assist him. 
According to Walter Irvin’s later account, when Deputy Yates arrived 
Yates noticed Irvin was not dead, and after clearing a jam to his 
service revolver, Deputy Yates shot Irvin again at close range. 127 
Samuel Shepherd died at the scene, but Walter Irvin somehow 
survived and relayed his account of the shooting to representatives of 
the NAACP from his hospital bed in Eustis. 128  A Lake County 
coroner’s inquest into the shooting exonerated Sheriff McCall,129 and 
Judge Futch determined there was no need for a grand jury 
investigation into the matter.130 
In the local press, the shooting was only vaguely referenced, and 
not even afforded headline status in The Mount Dora Topic.131 And 
what the local press termed a new turn and a strange twist in the case, 
the national press called a slaughter and a whitewash.132 The Crisis 
                                                
127 Later FBI investigative analysis determined this second shot into Walter Irvin 
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published a transcript of Walter Irvin’s hospital bed statement, 
endorsed it as a true statement of what actually happened, 133  and 
denounced the state of Florida for its determination “to whitewash the 
whole affair.”134 The Mount Dora Topic dismissively described Irvin’s 
account as bizarre.135 
Writing thirty-five years after the event, Steven F. Lawson 
theorized that Sheriff McCall planned to kill Irvin and Shepherd while 
transporting them that night, because he thought that would be best for 
Lake County. He wrote: 
Initially [when he hid the defendants from the lynch 
mob] McCall may have felt confident that the accused 
would be sentenced to death . . . When the United States 
Supreme Court overturned the case, however, McCall 
probably began to have second thoughts. Having 
promised the lynch mob and local residents that justice 
would be done, McCall possibly decided on the road to 
Tavares that the circumstances were convenient for him 
to take summary action . . . [Local] fruit growers were 
anxious for the issue to be settled because their black 
workers were becoming afraid to go to work as the trial 
approached. McCall may have thought that [this] 
action would return the county more quickly to 
normal.136 
In reality, this act created anything but a return to normalcy. 
Intense public outcry was led by the outspoken Florida chair of the 
NAACP, Mr. Harry T. Moore. Moore had worked tirelessly raising 
money throughout Florida to fund the Groveland Boys’ defense, and 
after the shooting on State Road 19 Moore began pressuring the 
governor and other state officials to remove McCall from office. Then, 
on Christmas Eve 1951, Moore and his wife were killed by a bomb 
placed under their bed at their home in Brevard County. Speaking for a 
silent majority, historian and author James C. Clark argued that ’ a 
                                                
133 Walter Irvin’s Story, supra note 128, at 641. 
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local Klansmen, at the behest of Sheriff McCall himself, carried out 
Moore’s assassination.137 
Now only Walter Irvin, alone and friendless,138 awaited his retrial. 
That date would come on February 11, 1952 in Marion County, 
Florida after Judge Futch granted the defense a change of venue 
motion and moved the second trial of the case to Ocala.139 However, 
since Marion County is also in Florida’s fifth judicial circuit, the 
presiding judge and the state attorney did not change. And, 
unfortunately for Walter Irvin, neither did the mindset or makeup of 
the prospective jury pool.140 
Now sitting at counsel table in the Marion County courthouse with 
a defiant calm,141 Irvin awaited his inevitable fate. Orlando civil rights 
attorney Alex Akerman, Jr. would again lead Irvin’s defense, but he 
now had considerably more muscle on his team. Paul Perkins, a black 
attorney from Daytona Beach was added, as were NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund attorneys Jack Greenberg and Thurgood Marshall. The 
addition of Marshall, who fifteen years later would become the first 
black appointee to the United States Supreme Court, added true star 
power to the defense team. Regardless of who tried the case for the 
defense, theirs would be a tough row to hoe. For all the star power at 
the defense table, they proved no match for Lake County’s dean of 
law, State Attorney Jesse W. Hunter. 142  Hunter, who solemnly 
informed the jury that because of a fatal malady this would be his last 
major case as their elected prosecutor,143 also made quick work of the 
new wrinkles in the defense’s case, perhaps more so because of his 
                                                
137 James C. Clark, Civil Rights Leader Harry T. Moore and the Ku Klux Klan in 
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receptive audience than his own legal acumen.144 Taking no chances, 
Hunter even flashed the Masonic hand signal for distress to the jurors 
on several occasions throughout his closing,145 so as to further impress 
upon them the importance of the meaning of their verdict to the central 
Florida way of life. Following the same pattern as the first trial, Walter 
Irvin’s retrial lasted just three days, and an all-white jury of his so-
called peers left the courtroom to deliberate once again on the fate of a 
Groveland defendant. When the jury returned less than two hours later, 
needing only enough time to finish their cigars,146 the reading of the 
verdicts was again a mere formality. On Valentine’s Day 1952, Judge 
Futch once more sentenced Walter Irvin to death. Exasperated, the 
national media called Irvin’s second death sentence in three years a 
tragic plight.147 
Undoubtedly, the Groveland case was a truly tragic affair, and 
every stereotype and look of disappointment directed at the citizens of 
central Florida was certainly deserved. The man at the center of the 
storm was Judge Truman G. Futch, a self-taught southern lawyer who 
was every bit the cracker as his constituents, and who was often 
equally deserving of much of the derision aimed in their direction. 
While the national media scoffed at the decision, noting Futch stopped 
whittling long enough only to deny defendants’ requests,148 a thorough 
legal analysis of the motions, briefs, and transcripts of the Groveland 
trials evidences the simple fact that Judge Futch was correct in the 
majority of his legal rulings throughout the two trials. Albeit the 
application of local prejudice to the Groveland case was tragically 
misguided and horribly wrong, Judge Futch’s application of the law to 
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the Groveland trials was, for the most part, accurate. A reexamination 
using the controlling legal standards of the first half of the 20th 
century reveals much about the decisions and rulings of the whittling 
judge who presided over Florida’s most notorious legal drama. 
PART II: THE LAW 
Judge and Jury Were Swept to the Fatal End 
The first major decisions presented to Judge Futch came early in 
the long history of the procedure of the case. As was the common 
practice of the day, and because the local community demanded swift 
justice, the Groveland Boys were indicted just four days after the 
alleged event. They were arraigned three weeks later, and the trial was 
set to begin in Tavares the following week. Not surprisingly, the 
defense objected to the timeframe and the location of the trial. For its 
time, the setting of the trial just over six weeks from the date of the 
event would not have been unreasonable, or even unusual. But, the 
Groveland case was anything but usual, and on the eve of the jury trial 
the defense team filed a motion to continue the trial, and a motion for 
removal of the cause (change of venue). Judge Truman Futch promptly 
denied both motions, and the trial was set to commence in Lake 
County on September 1, 1949—just 49 days after the event supposedly 
occurred. 
In analyzing the motion to continue, the defense relied on two 
basic grounds in support of that motion. On a practical level, the 
defense argued they had had inadequate time to investigate and 
prepare a defense. To support this argument, the defense pointed to the 
fact that NAACP attorney Frank Williams had only met with the 
defendants, at Florida State Prison near Starke, on July 31, 1949.149 
After his initial investigation, he and the NAACP began attempting to 
find a (white) Florida attorney who would agree to represent the 
accused. After failing to secure retentions of at least eleven Florida 
lawyers,150 all of whom feared loss of income, reputation, or safety if 
they took the case,151 Orlando attorney Alex Akerman, Jr. reluctantly 
                                                
149 Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing at 4, 12, Florida v. Shepherd, (D. Lake 
Cty. Fla. 1949) (on file with author). 
150 Id. at 6. 
151 Id. at 7; KING, supra note 6, at 137 (discussing Spessard Holland, Jr. tearfully 
declining the NAACP’s plea to represent the Groveland defendants, stating, 
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agreed to represent the Groveland Three.152 Akerman’s retention was 
secured on August 22, 1949—just three days before the date of the 
scheduled hearings on the pretrial motions.153 Ten days earlier, Judge 
Futch had appointed a local member of the Lake County bar, a Harry 
E. Gaylord of Eustis, to represent the three indigent defendants at their 
arraignment. Gaylord pled the defendants not guilty, and agreed to an 
August 29th trial date.154 
For Judge Futch, the analysis to deny the defendants’ motion to 
continue seemed reasonably simple. Using evidence adduced at the 
pretrial motion hearing by the state of Florida, the applicable Florida 
statutes, and local custom, Futch denied the motion. He was likely 
correct in doing so. In support of his decision, Futch could take solace 
in the following facts. The defendants’ appointed attorney at their 
arraignment had agreed to the trial date.155 Officials from the Florida 
State Prison confirmed that attorneys had met with the defendants on 
three separate occasions, 156  and that they had taken with them a 
stenographer, a dentist, and a doctor for the purposes of investigating 
and documenting a defense.157 Additionally, State Attorney Hunter had 
offered to use his resources to summon and serve any witnesses the 
defense may want to call at trial.158 While Akerman’s retention was 
certainly made late in the process, Judge Futch undoubtedly 
understood that late retention or substitution of counsel is rarely, if 
ever, a proper grounds for a continuance. The forty-five days from 
indictment to trial was consistent with the standards of the day, and 
was of no concern to either the Florida or United States Supreme 
Courts.159 Lastly, the Florida statutes instructed the judges that trials 
shall be conducted in the same court term in which a defendant, now in 
                                                                                                               
“[y]ou may not understand this, but my wife is a typical flower of southern 
womanhood and this is a rape case and I can’t take it.”). 
152 Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearings, supra note 149, at 7. 
153 Id. at 2. 
154 Id. at 22. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 26. 
157 Id. at 14, 27. 
158 Id. at 22. 
159 See Shepherd v. Florida, 46 So. 2d 880, 885 (Fla. 1950). “Frequently the minds 
of reasonable men differ on what constitutes sufficient time to prepare for trial.” 
Id. 
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state custody, was indicted.160 This statutorily authorized speedy trial 
requirement existed equally for both the state and the defense. 161 
Under the laws and customs of the day, Judge Futch’s denial of the 
continuance on the grounds of inadequate time for preparation was 
presumptively correct. 
But the greatest motivation for the defense requesting a 
continuance was not lack of time to prepare for trial, but rather the 
desire to allow time for local passions to subside.162 This second prong 
of their Motion to Continue created a much more difficult legal 
decision for the trial court. Two major cases gave the defense 
compelling arguments in seeking such a postponement. The first, 
Powell v. Alabama,163 was of particular benefit to the defense because 
it was the United States Supreme Court’s decision from the Scottsboro 
Boys case — the case with which the Groveland Boys saga was being 
compared. The second case, Moore v. Dempsey,164 was another United 
States Supreme Court case that detailed the dangers of public passions 
controlling legal proceedings. These two cases and the case at bar 
shared many of the same sad facts: three communities demonstrating 
great hostility, 165  atmospheres described as tense, hostile, and 
excited,166 insurrection throughout the county,167 a military presence to 
maintain order, a lynch mob ready to act if the courts did not, and a 
local press publishing inflammatory articles. 168  Clearly, Moore v. 
Dempsey was a warning to Lake County against falling into the trap 
                                                
160 FLA. STAT. § 909.23 (1949). 
161 Id. at § 916.01 (1949). But see, FLA. STAT. § 26.26 (1949), repealed by 2013 
Fla. Laws ch. 2013-25 § 1. Florida’s fifth judicial circuit trial terms, per statute, 
were the first Tuesdays of May and November, so Judge Futch could have 
agreed to continue the matter as far as early November without running afoul of 
Florida’s 1949 statutory speedy trial rights. 
162 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53 (1951). 
163 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). The trial of the Scottsboro Boys 
involved rape allegations by two white women against nine black youths. See 
generally 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
164 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923). In Dempsey, five black men were 
accused of killing a white man in Elaine, Arkansas during a period of 
community violence, originally instigated by local whites. See id. at 87-88. 
165 Powell, 287 U.S. at 51. 
166 Id. 
167 Moore, 261 U.S. at 88. 
168 Id. 
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demonstrated by Frank v. Mangum169—“If in fact a trial is dominated 
by a mob so that there is actual interference with the course of justice, 
there is a departure from due process of law[.]”170 The Moore court 
was warning of cases where the “[j]udge and jury were swept to the 
fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion.”171 The trial of the 
Groveland Boys seemed to be on a fatefully similar path. 
The Lake County court system, for its own practical reasons, 
wanted the matter of the Groveland Boys handled as quickly as 
possible. Those practical reasons were, quite simply, a desire to bring 
the mass demonstrations and violence in Lake County to an end as 
soon as possible.172 While this rationale may sound reasonable in light 
of community safety, it speaks volumes in terms of the true 
atmosphere of violence that surrounded the trial. Again, in spite of 
Powell and Moore, Judge Futch denied the defendants’ motion to 
continue. 173  While this legal decision was certainly questionable, 
Judge Futch was on firm ground in distinguishing Powell and Moore 
from the case at bar. In both Powell and Moore defense counsel was 
appointed on the same day the jury trial was to commence.174 They 
had, literally, no time to prepare or even meet with their clients before 
jury selection began. This was the only concern the United States 
Supreme Court had with the Powell verdict, and in fact said nothing 
about the trial atmosphere or the time from event to trial. When Judge 
Futch eyed his September 1, 1949 trial date, the fact that his 
defendants had first met with investigative counsel on July 31,175 had 
local counsel appointed on August 12, and had trial counsel retained 
                                                
169 See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). In Mangum, a Jewish factory 
superintendent, Leo Frank, was convicted of murdering a 13 year old female 
employee on questionable evidence. Id. at 311. When his death sentence was 
commuted to life in prison by the governor of Georgia, local citizens formed a 
mob, kidnapped Frank from the state prison, and lynched him. 
170 Moore, 261 U.S. at 90-91. 
171 Id.  
172 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53 
(1951). At a pretrial motion hearing Mabel Norris-Reese, editor of The Mount 
Dora Topic, testified that State Attorney Hunter had confided in her that the 
reason they wished to hold the trial as soon as possible was to put an end to the 
violence and demonstrations in Lake County. 
173 Florida v. Shepherd, (D. Fla. Lake Cty. Ct. 1949) (on file with author). 
174 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1932); Moore, 261 U.S. at 89.  
175 Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 4. 
222 UMass Law Review v. 11 | 194 
 
by August 22, he may have recognized that Powell and Moore were 
not to be the controlling precedents. While Futch’s ultimate decision 
or motives to deny the continuance may be criticized, his conclusion 
appears solid. 
Like Jerusalem Itself 
Intimately intertwined with the defendants’ 1949 motion to 
continue was their motion for removal of the cause (change of venue). 
Understandably, the removal motion relied on essentially the same 
facts and the same arguments of law as the motion to continue — 
namely, that adverse pretrial publicity and a pervasive local climate of 
prejudice and violence precluded the ability to obtain a fair trial in 
Lake County. Certainly to the modern legal scholar, or anyone 
applying a modicum of 21st century common sense, this motion 
should have been granted. But not surprisingly, in 1949, Judge Futch 
denied it. Ironically, three years later during the 1952 retrial of Walter 
Irvin, Judge Futch did grant a motion to change the venue of Irvin’s 
trial, but only removed the trial to the adjacent county of Marion. 
Marion County was also in Florida’s fifth judicial circuit, had a similar 
demographic makeup to that of Lake, and was also served by both 
himself and State Attorney Hunter. To this end, Irvin’s 1952 change of 
venue was hardly that, but Judge Futch’s decisions on both were likely 
correct under the law of the day and the evidence presented. Both 
decisions are analyzed below. 
As to Judge Futch’s 1949 decision, Florida statute 911.02 provided 
for a change of venue when a fair and impartial trial cannot be had,176 
and it would seem that if any case in Florida’s legal history should 
have warranted its application, it was the 1949 Groveland case.177 
Even Judge Futch’s own well-intentioned special rules of courtroom 
decorum, put in place for the 1949 Lake County trial, seemed to 
evidence the specter of violence surrounding the proceedings. 178 
                                                
176 FLA. STAT. § 911.02 (1949). 
177 See, e.g., CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 35. In response to the unprecedented 
violence surrounding the Groveland case, the governor of Florida activated three 
local national guard units from Leesburg, Eustis, and Tampa and dispatched 
them to Lake County, where they remained until July 27, 1949. 
178 See Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 54.  The trial judge, anxious to assure as 
fair a trial as possible under the circumstances, was evidently concerned about 
violence at the trial. Id. He promulgated special rules which limited the number 
of visitors to those that could be seated, allowed no one to stand or loiter in 
hallways, stairways, and parts of the courthouse for thirty minutes before court 
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Change of venue (or removal) motions were a peculiar tool in the first 
half of the 20th century. Their application was subject to wide 
discretion within the trial courts, and those decisions would not be 
disturbed on appeal absent a palpable abuse of discretion. 179  A 
palpable abuse of discretion is arguably the toughest legal standard to 
surmount on appeal. The standard essentially means that if there is any 
modicum of reason to the trial judge’s decision, even a small one, that 
decision will be upheld. In analyzing Judge Futch’s 1949 and 1952 
removal rulings, we can find several such modicums of reason, even if 
they may seem slight or antiquated from the modern perspective. 
For starters, it is important to note that changes of venue cannot be 
granted simply for purposes of forum shopping, selecting a friendlier 
jurisdiction, or finding a county where a desired outcome is more 
likely. This rationale would also apply to finding a county with better 
race relations, or a more progressive outlook within their white 
community. Secondly, assuming a fair trial can arguably be had in 
such a location, the state has an equally compelling right to have the 
case tried in the county where the crime occurred. This is the most 
basic premise of common law jurisdiction. To that end, State Attorney 
Jesse Hunter was probably correct when he argued in his answer to 
application for removal of cause that any such negative pretrial 
publicity regarding the Groveland case was so pervasive statewide that 
it would be near impossible to find any other county in Florida—or in 
the breadth of the South for that matter—that would have provided a 
more impartial jury pool.180 
                                                                                                               
convened and after it recessed, closed the elevators except to officers of the 
court or individuals to whom the sheriff gave special permit, required each 
person entering the courtroom to submit to search, prohibited any person from 
taking a ‘valise, satchel, bag, basket, bottle, jar, jug, bucket, package, bundle, or 
other such item’ to the courtroom floor of the courthouse, allowed crutches, 
canes and walking sticks only after inspection by the sheriff showed them to be 
necessary aids, prohibited demonstrations of any nature and made various other 
regulations, all of which the sheriff was charged to enforce and to that end was 
authorized to employ such number of deputies as might be necessary. Id. Such 
precautions, however commendable, show the reaction that the atmosphere 
which permeated the trial created in the mind of the trial judge. Id. 
179 Shepherd v. Florida, 46 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 1950); Jeffcoat v. Florida, 138 So. 
385, 387 (Fla. 1931). 
180 Answer to Application for Removal of Cause, supra note 98, at 4; cf. Shepherd, 
46 So. 2d at 883. The Florida Supreme Court likely grossly overstated Lake 
County’s positive race relations when it wrote, “[o]ur study of the record reflects 
 
224 UMass Law Review v. 11 | 194 
 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the fact that Judge 
Futch’s removal rulings carried the necessary legal threshold of the 
day can be found in two simple facts. First, in spite of the availability 
of sixty peremptory juror challenges, or strikes,181 juries in both cases 
were selected with very little difficulty and in a matter of a few hours. 
Second, as governed by the high courts of the day, in four separate 
appeals to the Florida and United States Supreme Courts, the issue of 
venue was never addressed in a negative fashion despite being clearly 
raised by the defense in both appeals. Silence by the appellate courts 
regarding matters directly questioned on appeal did, and does, speak 
loudly. 
The 1952 retrial of defendant Walter Irvin forced Judge Futch to 
make two more major legal rulings in relation to a defense motion to 
remove. In anticipation of the 1952 retrial, which was removed to 
Marion County for reasons discussed below, the NAACP hired a 
professional polling firm 182  to gather race-relations data on four 
Florida counties. 183  This data was to be used for purposes of 
supporting their motion for removal. It should be noted that, as appears 
to be the common practice of the day, the court stenographer did not 
take down a verbatim account of the legal arguments surrounding this 
issue. However, since this matter was briefed by both sides and 
commented on throughout the appellate proceedings of the case, an 
investigation can comfortably reconstruct those missing portions of the 
transcripts.184 
                                                                                                               
the view that harmony and good will and friendly relations continuously existed 
between white and colored races in all other sections of Lake County.” Id. 
181 See FLA. STAT. § 913.08(1) (1949). Each defendant in a criminal jury trial was 
granted 10 peremptory challenges in a death penalty case, and the State received 
an equal total number. In the 1949 trial there were three defendants, thus thirty 
total defense strikes, plus a matching number for the State, equals sixty 
peremptory strikes between the two sides. Additionally, challenges for cause 
were unlimited in number. 
182 Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 291 (Fla. 1953). 
183  Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2 at 24, Irvin v. Florida, (D. Fla. 
1952) (removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author). The polling data was 
collected for Florida’s Lake, Marion, Gadsden, and Jackson counties. Id. 
184 It bears mentioning that throughout the various transcripts of the hearings and 
trials surrounding the Groveland case there are numerous periods of pure legal 
argument in which the court reporter notes he will not take down a verbatim 
record of the account. This seems to be a product of the fact that court reporters 
of the time viewed their transcription roles as being limited to the recording of 
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Ultimately, Judge Futch refused to allow the polling data to be 
entered into evidence, except for that limited data that related to 
Marion County. 185  This was likely the correct decision, but Judge 
Futch could have handled the matter in a more prudent manner. 
Because this was a pretrial motion hearing which took place outside 
the presence of the jury, the more advisable judicial maneuver would 
have been for Judge Futch to simply allow all the defendant’s polling 
data into evidence, and then only assign to it what weight he 
considered necessary. Total exclusion of the defense evidence, in a 
matter decided by the bench and that would never be seen by any jury, 
seemed too harsh a remedy. Futch’s ultimate decision on the matter 
was the classic tipsy coachman conundrum  of arriving at the correct 
conclusion through the application of incorrect rationale. 186  In 
excluding the polling data, Judge Futch found the evidence to be 
inadmissible hearsay (or perhaps improperly authenticated), because 
the polling coordinator who was called by the defense to testify at the 
January 1952 pretrial hearing merely compiled the data and did not 
conduct the interviews himself. 187  Issues of hearsay and improper 
authentication awkwardly batted around by the trial court, both parties, 
and the Florida Supreme Court, 188  were all incorrect paths, which 
ultimately led to the correct result. The polling data, if properly 
presented, might have survived hearsay and authentication 
                                                                                                               
witness testimony and evidence introduction (functions of the trial court), and 
not the recordings of legal arguments (functions of the appellate courts). 
185 Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 50. 
186 James A. Herb & Jay L. Kauffman, Tales of the Tipsy Coachman: Being Right 
for the Wrong Reason – The Tipsy Coachman is Alive and Well and Living in 
Florida, 81 FLA. BAR J., 11 (Dec. 2007). The first legal reference to the tipsy 
coachman appeared in the 1879 opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court in Lee v. 
Porter, 63 Ga. 345 (1879), which states the rationale underlying the doctrine: ‘It 
may be that we would draw very different inferences [than those drawn by the 
trial judge], and these differences might go to uphold the judgment; for many 
steps in the reasoning of the court below might be defective, and still its ultimate 
conclusion be correct. Lee, 63 Ga. at 346. It not infrequently happens that a 
judgment is affirmed upon a theory of the case which did not occur to the court 
that rendered it, or which did occur and was expressly repudiated. Id. The 
human mind is so constituted that in many instances it finds the truth when 
wholly unable to find the way that leads to it. Id. 
187 Brief of Appellee at 7, Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953). 
188 See, e.g., id.; Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearings Part 2, supra note 183, at 
36; Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 291-92 (Fla. 1953). 
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objections.189 The argument that best warranted their exclusion was 
finally stumbled upon by the Florida Supreme Court when it 
determined that this type of polling data was not a reliable method of 
determining the likelihood of a fair trial. 190  In sum, the data was 
excluded due to unreliability. This determination was firmly within the 
province of the trial court, and Judge Futch’s ruling on such a matter 
was only subject to review on an abuse of discretion standard.191 Given 
the facts and limitations of this particular polling data, 192  Judge 
Futch’s decision to exclude it was reasonable. 
The second major removal issue facing Judge Futch during the 
1952 retrial of Walter Irvin involved the change of the trial venue from 
Tavares in Lake County, to Ocala in neighboring Marion. On 
December 6, 1951 State Attorney Jesse Hunter agreed to Walter 
Irvin’s request to remove the trial from Tavares,193 which sits only 
twenty-some miles from the alleged crime scene. In response to this 
stipulation, Judge Futch ordered the removal of the trial venue to the 
bordering county of Marion and its courthouse in Ocala. Sitting nearly 
fifty miles to the north of Tavares and sixty miles north of Groveland, 
                                                
189 See FLA. STAT. § 92.36 (1951) (indicating that Florida’s Business Records and 
Evidence Act may have allowed for the admission of such data as a properly 
compiled business record, but since this data was collected in anticipation of 
litigation it may have fallen outside of this provision). 
190 Irvin, 66 So. 2d at 291. “We cannot approve this method of determining the 
likelihood of a defendant’s being unable to receive a fair trial in a given 
community and therefore cannot attribute any abuse of discretion to the rejection 
by the judge of the proposed testimony. As the appellant points out the 
establishment of adverse sentiment of such degree as to indicate that the victim 
of it cannot receive a fair trial is informal and largely based upon hearsay. But 
the result of the poll taken in this case went far beyond the latitude allowed by 
the statute and by established procedure.” Id. 
191 Id. 
192 See Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 36, 52. The 
polling data compiler, while testifying at the hearing, admitted several questions 
having nothing to do with the case; he could not articulate why Gadsden and 
Jackson counties were selected for comparison; and he admitted comparing 
Gadsden to Marion County was unfair due to recent political events in both 
counties. One of the control questions was clearly misleading, and the pollster 
admitted he could not draw a conclusion on the ultimate issue inquired of by the 
poll. 
193 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State 
Att’y, and Suppression of Evidence at 25, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) 
(removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author).  
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Ocala offered a slightly larger city to host such a major event, but the 
demographics and racial attitudes of the two locales were nearly 
indistinguishable. Most importantly, and of the greatest concern to the 
defense, was the fact that Marion County also sat within Florida’s fifth 
judicial circuit, meaning Judge Futch and State Attorney Hunter would 
still be handling the case. 
Under the rationale outlined above, Judge Futch may well have 
been justified in refusing to change the venue at all. Even so, the 
decision to place it in Lake’s sister county of Marion may still seem 
odd at first blush. However, once the order was made to change the 
venue, the placement of the trial in Marion County was the correct 
decision under the applicable law of the day. Florida statute 911.02(2) 
provided that upon the granting of a change of venue motion, the 
matter shall be removed to the appropriate criminal court “in some 
adjoining county if there [is] one.”194 In 1952 the fifth judicial circuit 
of Florida was comprised of five counties,195 but only Marion and 
Sumter adjoined Lake.196 Given the option of Marion or Sumter, one 
might argue that Marion was certainly the lesser of those two evils. 
Ironically, the selection of this much larger jurisdiction197 was likely a 
tiny—albeit understandably unappreciated—victory for Walter Irvin 
and his defense team. 
In support of the selection of Marion County, and in an effort to 
protect his record on appeal, State Attorney Hunter called numerous 
civic and community leaders to testify to the positive race relations in 
that county. 198  This evidence was largely uncontroverted by the 
                                                
194 FLA. STAT. § 911.02(2) (1951) (emphasis added). 
195 Id. at § 26.06 (1951). Lake, Marion, Sumter, Hernando, and Citrus counties 
composed the fifth circuit. 
196 Florida County Map, GEOLOGY, http://geology.com/county-map/florida.shtml 
(depicting Lake County bordered entirely to the west by Sumter County, and to 
the north and west by Marion County). Hernando and Citrus Counties do not 
adjoin Lake County, as they sit to the west of Sumter County. See id. 
197 Richard L. Forstal, Florida, Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 
to 1990, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, (Mar. 27, 1995), 
https://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/cencounts/files/fl190090.t
xt (according to the 1950 U.S. census populations were: Marion County - 
38,187, Sumter - 11,330).  
198 See, e.g., Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 105 
(quoting a Marion County black preacher testifying that “[he] would put this 
county up against Jerusalem itself”); Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 292 (1953) 
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defense,199 as they called no live witnesses to contradict the state’s 
contentions. Additionally, Hunter successfully argued that no other 
circuit in Florida would be so acutely aware of the proper selection of 
jurors in compliance with the dictates of Cassell v. Texas as would the 
Fifth Circuit, since a Cassell violation was the sole reason they were 
retrying the matter at all.200 In following the provisions of Chapter 
911, the arguments of the state attorney, and the best evidence 
available to him at the hearing, Judge Futch correctly removed Walter 
Irvin’s 1952 trial to the adjoining county of Marion. 
I’m Not Going to Tell You What He Told Me 
Since the days of the English Common Law, criminal trial law has 
never been a trial by ambush.201 One of the bedrock concepts of trial 
procedure is the necessity of the prosecution to share information with 
the accused. While these requirements of discovery and disclosure 
have broadened over time, Judge Futch and State Attorney Hunter did 
correctly comply with the (relatively limited) disclosure obligations of 
the day. 
When State Attorney Jesse Hunter learned from the Lake County 
clerk that two attorneys, one from Tampa and the other from Miami, 
might have been retained to represent the defendants in the case, 
Hunter contacted them both and offered them any information that was 
available to him. Furthermore, he contacted Florida State Prison on 
their behalf and asked prison officials there to make the defendants 
available for interviews with counsel. 202  At the August 12, 1949 
arraignment, local appointed counsel Harry Gaylord motioned the 
court for the appointment of a doctor and a dentist to evaluate the 
defendants, and Futch granted those motions.203 X-rays taken of the 
                                                                                                               
(citing the fact that Ocala had recently erected a World War II memorial to a 
colored soldier as evidence of racial good will). 
199 But see Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 113-14. 
Irvin’s defense team did point out on cross examination of a state’s witness that 
when the well-respected white sheriff of Marion County was shot and killed by 
a black suspect just a few years before this date, the trial of the black suspect 
was removed to Alachua County of the eighth judicial circuit of Florida because 
the court felt he couldn’t get a fair trial in Marion. Id. 
200 Answer to Application for Removal of Cause, supra note 98, at 5. 
201 See generally Barrett v. Florida, 649 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1994). 
202 Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 17. 
203 Id. at 22. 
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defendants at Florida State Prison were also provided to the defense.204 
Lastly, State Attorney Hunter included a written version of his trial 
witness list on the grand jury indictment,205 which was filed with the 
clerk. In the 1949 trial of the Groveland Three, Florida’s statutory 
discovery obligations had been properly complied with.206 
By late 1951 however, on the eve of Walter Irvin’s retrial in 
Marion County, the defense asked the Court to compel the production 
of the substance of in-office interviews between the state attorney and 
a key defense witness, a Mr. Lawrence Burtoft. 207  Judge Futch 
correctly, under the controlling law of the time, denied the defense 
motion. Lawrence Burtoft was the first person to come into contact 
with Norma Lee Padgett after her alleged rape, and he had knowledge 
of several facts that directly contradicted key aspects of her testimony. 
Specifically, Mr. Burtoft would testify that although Norma Lee told 
him she was abducted, she did not mention the fact that she was raped. 
Additionally, and most importantly, she clearly indicated she could not 
identify her assailants.208 Of course, within just a few hours of their 
arrest or death she had positively identified all four. These pieces of 
exculpatory information were not relayed by the state to the defense. 
Clearly, following the United States Supreme Court’s landmark 1963 
decision in Brady v. Maryland, such disclosure of exculpatory 
information would now be required, and reversal would result should 
such a disclosure fail to occur.209 Such was not the case in the years in 
which the Groveland matter was pending. Four years before Judge 
Futch’s correct denial of this 1951 defense Motion to Compel, the 
                                                
204 Id. at 27. 
205 Answer to Application for Removal of Cause, supra note 98, at 2. 
206 See FLA. STAT. § 909.18 (1949) (detailing the discovery obligations of the State 
Attorney’s Office in criminal prosecutions to include allowing the inspection, 
copying, photographing, and examination of any ballistics, fingerprints, semen, 
blood, stains, documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, 
or tangible things pertinent to the cause). 
207 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State 
Att’y, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 16-18. In over two pages 
of hearing transcript, State Attorney Hunter tells defense attorney Akerman that 
he will not divulge the substance of his interview with Mr. Burtoft six times. Id. 
208 See Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 388. 
209 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91 (1963) (reiterating that “the suppression or 
withholding, by the State, of material evidence exculpatory to the accused is a 
violation of due process”). 
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United States Supreme Court decided Hickman v. Taylor, which 
established the basic premise that an attorney’s work product applied 
to his written notes and his oral interviews with witnesses made in the 
course of litigation preparation, and that they were privileged from 
disclosure. 210  When Hickman is combined with the two major 
exculpatory evidence disclosure cases of the time, which only required 
the state to disclose knowingly false or perjurious testimony,211 we can 
see that—at the time—Hunter was justified in withholding the 
information, and Futch was correct in denying the motion to force its 
production. 
The Court Takes No Action 
Upon entering the courthouse in Tavares for the 1949 Lake County 
trial of the Groveland Three, the defense filed a motion to quash the 
indictment based on Lake County’s improper grand jury selection 
procedures—based specifically on the fact that potentially eligible 
black jurors were knowingly and systematically excluded from 
service.212  Judge Futch properly refused to hear the motion, as he 
correctly determined it to be untimely under the law.213 
In 1949, Florida law did allow for a defendant to challenge an 
indictment based on the grounds of unlawful selection procedures214 of 
a grand jury panel.215 As this was precisely the issue at hand, the 
defense motion to quash was properly styled, factually accurate, and 
legally correct. However, 1949 Florida procedure required a challenge 
to an indictment returned by such an incorrectly impaneled grand jury 
to be made at or before arraignment.216 Furthermore, if such challenge 
                                                
210 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947). 
211 See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (explaining that the 
prosecution must disclose known perjured testimony); see also Pyle v. Kansas, 
317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942) (declaring unconstitutional the use of perjured 
testimony to obtain a conviction). 
212 See Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 177, 179-81, 183. 
Several county civil officials testified that Lake County’s grand jury selection 
process involved the requirement that the prospective grand juror be a registered 
voter. This greatly reduced the number of eligible black jurors, and was not a 
requirement of Florida Statutes, Chapter 40. This additional requirement clearly 
ran afoul of Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). 
213 Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 8. 
214 FLA. STAT. § 905.03 (1951). 
215 Id. at § 905.02. 
216 Id. at § 909.01. 
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was not made as of that time, it was deemed waived.217 As of August 
12, 1949, when the defendants were arraigned under the guidance of 
locally appointed counsel, no such challenge was made. Therefore, 
Judge Futch was correct in considering the motion, made on the eve of 
trial and well after arraignment, to be untimely. 
While Futch’s ruling on the procedural posture of the motion, as 
presented to him, was correct, ultimately the United States Supreme 
Court would agree with the defense that improper grand jury selection 
procedures did warrant a reversal of the case.218 In fairness to Judge 
Futch, however, it should be noted that Cassel v. Texas, the case which 
served as the precedent for the reversal of the Groveland case, was not 
decided until after the Groveland case had been tried, but before its 
appeal.219 Thus, neither Judge Futch nor the defense had the Cassell 
precedent available for consideration when contemplating this matter. 
That Little Black Nigger Boy’s Clothes 
A few hours after Norma Lee Padgett accused four young black 
men of rape, Lake County Deputy Sheriff James Yates stood at the 
crime scene with the recently arrested Walter Irvin. Deputy Yates had 
just arrested Irvin at his home moments earlier, and he had taken Irvin 
to the site of the alleged rape in the hopes of making a shoe print 
comparison with tracks at the scene. When none of the prints seemed 
to match, Yates asked Irvin if he had been wearing different shoes the 
previous evening. Irvin indicated that in fact he had been, and that the 
shoes he wore the night before were back at his family’s home in 
Groveland, where he had just been arrested.220 This interaction would 
be read with great legal concern by the modern criminal attorney, but 
Yates’ inculpatory interview of Walter Irvin found its way into 
evidence, before the jury, and without an objection. This was because, 
in the years before the 1966 Miranda v. Arizona decision,221  such 
                                                
217 Id. at § 909.06. 
218 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951). 
219 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). The case was decided on April 24, 1950, 
roughly seven months after the 1949 Groveland verdicts were entered. 
220 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 328. 
221 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (creating the prophylactic rule that a 
government official now, upon initiation of custodial interrogation, must advise 
the suspect of his 5th and 6th Amendment rights). 
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custodial interrogation was not improper. 222  Armed with this 
information, Deputy Yates returned to Walter Irvin’s home, where he 
informed Irvin’s mother Deliah that he “came for that little black 
nigger boy’s clothes.”223 Deliah Irvin, a woman with a second grade 
education 224  and ignorant of her rights, 225  did as the armed 226 
representative of the law227 instructed, providing Yates with her son’s 
clothing and shoes from the previous evening. Deliah Irvin’s verbal 
statements to Yates were objected to by the defense, but their objection 
was correctly overruled, as such statements of consent would be 
properly considered as non-hearsay verbal acts.228 
The issue of the search and ultimate seizure of Walter Irvin’s 
belongings, and most notably the shoes he wore during the time of the 
alleged offense, was argued before the trial court over a two day 
period during the 1949 trial, and then again during a pretrial motion 
hearing before the 1952 retrial. Much to the concern of Irvin’s defense 
team, none of those legal arguments were transcribed.229 Ultimately 
however, the issue was briefed for appellate purposes and the Florida 
Supreme Court inexplicably ruled there was no Constitutional 4th 
                                                
222 See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) (indicating that a self-
incriminating 5th Amendment statement’s admissibility was purely a question of 
voluntariness); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941) 
(explaining that suspects have the free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer 
police questioning); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (declaring that the 
privilege against self-incrimination is fulfilled only when the person was 
guaranteed the right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak). 
223 Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing Part 2, supra note 183, at 144. 
224 Id. at 151. 
225 Id. at 148. 
226 Id. at 145. 
227  Transcript of Pretrial Motions Hearing, supra note 149, at 565. 
228 See Porter v. Ferguson, 4 Fla. 102, 105 (1851) (instructing that “[t]he 
declarations of a party, made at the time of a transaction, and expressive of its 
character, motive, or object, are regarded as verbal acts, indicating a present 
purpose and intention, and, therefore, admitted in proof, like any other material 
facts”). 
229 After the retrial of Walter Irvin, Akerman wrote to the NAACP’s Jack 
Greenberg, “I am somewhat concerned over Paul [Perkins’] report that the Court 
Reporter would not honor his order for a copy of Hunter’s argument. I am afraid 
that the record may appear as different from what actually happened but we will 
see when the record is furnished.” Letter, from Alex Akerman, Jr. to Jack 
Greenberg, (April 13, 1952) (on file with author). 
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Amendment violation since there were no elements of search or 
seizure.230 How the Florida Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion 
that there was no seizure when inculpatory evidence was removed 
from the private bedroom closet of a criminal suspect defies all legal 
logic, but this conclusion was not questioned by the United States 
Supreme Court.231 For purposes of this analysis, no weight is placed 
on the findings of these high courts. 
At the 1949 trial, Judge Futch denied the motion to suppress, and 
the Florida Supreme Court affirmed his ruling on the misplaced belief 
that Deputy Yates had asked politely for the clothing, and that Deliah 
Irvin freely provided access to the same.232 In reconstructing the likely 
arguments of these un-transcribed hearings based on the available 
legal scholarship and the records on appeal, we know the defense 
based their arguments around the theories of acquiescence to 
authority233 and third party consent.234 Specifically, they argued that 
Deliah Irvin could not have provided knowing and voluntary consent 
to the search of her home, and specifically to that of Walter Irvin’s 
private bedroom. To support those theories, the defense posited that 
Mrs. Irvin’s consent to search her son’s bedroom was only given 
because of the overt show of police authority exerted upon her by 
Deputy Yates. Furthermore, even if she did freely consent she was not 
entitled to grant such consent on her adult son’s behalf over his private 
sleeping quarters. As a corollary argument, the defense also 
complained of the fact that Deputy Yates failed to obtain a warrant, 
although obtaining one would have been quite simple. The reliance on 
                                                
230 Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 293 (1953). 
231 Irvin v. Florida, 346 U.S. 927 (1954) (certiorari denied). 
232 Irvin, 66 So. 2d at 293. “The mother testified that when the officer appeared, he 
did not threaten her or attempt to coerce her. Id. When asked if ‘he [the deputy] 
just politely asked you for the clothes and shoes’, she replied, ‘yes, sir, he did, 
and I got them for him because he was the law.’” Id. 
233 See generally Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (explaining that a 
consent to a search or seizure will be deemed invalid if the government official 
makes such a show of his authority so as to negate the free and voluntary choice 
to refuse said search or seizure). 
234 See generally Fuller v. Florida, 31 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1947) (explaining that a third 
party may consent to a search or seizure on behalf of a suspect is a factual matter 
determined on a case-by-case basis and relates primarily to the level of 
independent control said third party exerts over the place to be searched or the 
thing to be seized). 
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this argument, however, was clearly as misplaced then as it would be 
now.235 
Without any articulation of rationale, as was his custom, Judge 
Futch denied Walter Irvin’s Motion to Suppress. We now turn our 
attention to the accuracy of that ruling. Again, it is the tipsy coachman 
doctrine that comes to Judge Futch’s aid. While Futch presumably 
denied the motion based on a misguided finding of consent, the denial 
of the motion was likely legally correct under a different theory in 
1949—that of search incident to arrest. The seminal case in this area of 
the law at the time of the Groveland trials was that of Agnello v. 
United States. Under Agnello, police practitioners of the time would 
have understood “[t]he right without a search warrant . . . to search the 
place where the arrest was made in order to find and seize things 
connected with the crime . . . is not to be doubted.”236 This doctrine 
was reaffirmed and even extended in the case of Harris v. United 
States, decided by the United States Supreme Court just two years 
before the Groveland case. In Harris the Court wrote, “[s]earch and 
seizure incident to a lawful arrest is a practice of ancient origin and has 
long been an integral part of the law enforcement procedures of the 
United States and of the individual states.”237  Furthermore, “[i]t is 
equally clear that a search incident to arrest, which is otherwise 
reasonable, is not automatically rendered invalid by the fact that a 
dwelling place . . . is subjected to [the] search,”238 and such a search 
“can extend beyond the room in which the [subject] was arrested.”239 
Based on the language above, the Harris case is squared with the case 
at bar. Knowing he had no involvement in wrongdoing, Walter Irvin 
welcomed Deputy Yates into his home upon Yates’ initial arrival at 
around daybreak of July 17, 1949. Once inside, Yates arrested Irvin, 
then drove Irvin out to the crime scene somewhere near the Lake-
Sumter county border, and then drove Irvin back to his Groveland 
home upon learning the shoes he was looking for were still in Irvin’s 
                                                
235 This case was decided while the Groveland case was pending, but the defense 
was already arguing the wrong test. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 
56, 66 (1950) (declaring the relevant test is not whether it was reasonable to 
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable). 
236 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). 
237 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947). 
238 Id. at 151. 
239 The defendant in Harris, just like Walter Irvin, was arrested in his living room, 
but the evidence was found in his bedroom. Id. at 152. 
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closet. Upon returning to the Irvin house, Yates encountered Deliah 
Irvin, effectuated his search, and seized the correct shoes. While this 
search of Irvin’s home occurred after some temporal break, it could 
certainly be argued that since the search incident to the arrest would 
have been proper just moments before, it would still be a valid search. 
Assuming this rationale to be correct, Judge Futch’s denial of the 
motion to suppress was proper. 
The defense sought to readdress the matter as the 1952 retrial of 
Walter Irvin drew near. Judge Futch added a degree of difficulty for 
the defense in this regard when Walter Irvin himself was not made 
available to testify at the 1952 suppression hearing, because Judge 
Futch did not have him transported from Florida State Prison for that 
hearing. While Futch may very well have understood that Irvin’s 
absence would deprive his defense team of the value of his testimony 
and insight into the facts supporting the renewing of their motion, his 
failure to have Irvin transported to the hearing was in accordance with 
Florida law, which did not require the presence of defendants at 
pretrial motion hearings.240 
The second hurdle facing the defense in their renewed 1952 motion 
to suppress was the doctrine of the law of the case. When both the 
Florida and United States Supreme Courts chose to not address Judge 
Futch’s 1949 ruling on the suppression motion, at the 1952 retrial 
Futch correctly kept the same ruling intact under this doctrine.241 The 
concept of the law of the case stands for the proposition that, when an 
appellate court passes upon a question and remands the cause for 
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the 
case, and it remains as the ruling in effect throughout the pendency of 
the matter.242 It is also worth noting that this application of the law of 
the case doctrine would have been correct even if a different trial judge 
had been presiding over the 1952 retrial, because even a successor 
                                                
240 FLA. STAT. § 914.01 (1951) (codifying that pretrial motion hearings are not one 
of the enumerated circumstances requiring a defendant’s presence). 
241 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State 
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 24. 
242 See Ball v. Yates, 29 So. 2d 729, 738 (1946) (clarifying the general rule that 
“[t]he ‘law of the case’ has to do with questions of ‘law’ decided on appeal as 
applied to subsequent proceedings of the case. . . The decisions agree that as a 
general rule, when an appellate court passes upon a question and remands the 
cause for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the ‘law of the 
case’ upon a subsequent appeal . . .”). 
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judge would have been bound by Judge Futch’s original 1949 ruling 
once it was passed upon by the appellate courts.   
Unfortunately for Walter Irvin and his Groveland co-defendants, 
who were undoubtedly damaged by association with Irvin’s 
inculpatory evidence, it was not until the United States Supreme Court 
decided the 1969 case of Chimel v. California that the police actions 
such as those of Deputy Yates’ on July 17, 1949 were curtailed.243 
Through the right conclusion but under the wrong rationale, Judge 
Futch’s allowing Walter Irvin’s infamous shoes into evidence paved 
the way for another of the many terrible injustices that compounded 
themselves into the full tragedy that was the Groveland 
prosecutions.244 
A Fair and Clean Prosecutor 
Before the 1952 retrial of Walter Irvin, the defense filed a motion 
to disqualify J.W. Hunter as State Attorney. In it, they claimed that 
Hunter had not conducted the prosecution of the case in a fair and 
impartial manner. 245  Specifically, the defense alleged Hunter gave 
news interviews with false information, that Hunter refused to turn 
over exculpatory evidence, and that he improperly intervened into the 
United States Department of Justice’s investigation into the shooting 
death of defendant Samuel Shepherd by Lake County Sheriff Willis 
McCall.246 These matters and others were taken up at a December 6, 
1951 pretrial hearing in Tavares. The hearing was a complete and total 
victory for the prosecution, and a detailed examination of the legal 
analysis applied justified this result. 
                                                
243 Chimel began the process of severely limiting the search incident to arrest 
exemption by greatly curtailing the timeframes, areas, and propriety of such 
searches. See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
244 See KING, supra note 6, at 356. Expert witnesses later concluded that Deputy 
Yates’ plaster cast shoe print evidence in the Groveland case was forged. No 
human foot was in the shoes from which Yates made the casts. This fraudulent 
evidence was crucial in linking the Groveland defendants to the crime scene. 
Even worse, in 1962, Yates was federally indicted by the FBI for criminally 
falsifying plaster cast evidence in another investigation, but the case against him 
was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Yates was immediately 
reinstated as deputy by Sheriff McCall, and awarded back-pay for his missed 
time. 
245 Motion to Disqualify State Attorney at 2, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) 
(removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author). 
246 Id. at 2-3. 
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The pretrial hearing ended as a victory for the state because the 
defense failed to prove any of their allegations.247  At the hearing, 
through defense direct examinations, it became clear that it was likely 
Sheriff Willis McCall—not State Attorney Hunter—who had provided 
the press with false information.248 Then, as was analyzed earlier in 
this work, Judge Futch correctly ruled that Hunter’s refusal to disclose 
the exculpatory evidence provided to him during his investigatory 
interview with witness Lawrence Burtoft was proper. 249  Lastly, no 
evidence or testimony was presented to support the defense contention 
that Hunter was improperly involved in the Department of Justice’s 
investigation of Samuel Shepherd’s death at the hands of Sheriff 
McCall. 
The evidence that the defense did attempt to admit—
predominantly local and national news articles—Judge Futch unwisely 
excluded. While he may have been correct in viewing the defense 
subpoenas for such information as unduly over-broad,250 Futch would 
have been wiser to simply admit the evidence and then assign it little 
weight. Just as he did with the bulk of the defendant’s polling data 
evidence, Judge Futch overreached in excluding defense evidence 
from these two non-jury hearings. However, unlike the polling data 
evidence, there is reason to believe that Futch may have had genuine 
concerns that if he admitted too many anti-Hunter documents one of 
them may have contained a true bombshell. His poor decision to keep 
all of this evidence out of the public record may have been motivated 
less by true legal acuity than by a desire to protect the good name of a 
good friend. Either way, this was poor judicial practice. 
In response to the defense motion to disqualify him, Hunter filed 
affidavits from eleven leading local civic and legal personalities251 in 
                                                
247 See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of 
State Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 4-24.  
248 This false information was largely disseminated via press reports, likely 
provided by Sheriff McCall, that the Groveland defendants had confessed to the 
crime while in custody, when in fact, there were no such confessions, or the so-
called confessions were obtained through unlawful police brutality. Id. at 18-19. 
249 Id. at 17-18. Prior to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), this interview 
constituted attorney work product and was therefore exempt from disclosure.  
250 Futch properly criticizes the defense for utilizing blunderbuss subpoenas that are 
vague and over broad. Id. at 7. 
251 Id. at 22-23. 
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support of his position as a fair and clean prosecutor.252  Although 
common sense might tell us that Judge Futch needed little convincing 
as to the professional reputation of his lifelong friend and colleague, 
the weight of these affidavits was, no doubt, compelling to the neutral 
observer. 253  The affidavits described Hunter as a practitioner of 
eminent fairness and impartiality,254 and relayed a series of cases and 
anecdotes detailing Hunter’s history of fair dealing in race-related 
prosecutions.255 When the defense objected on grounds that affidavits 
were an improper form of evidence in such a hearing,256 Judge Futch 
correctly overruled the objection.257 
From an evidentiary analysis alone, Futch’s decision and desire to 
deny the motion to disqualify Hunter would have been relatively easy. 
All the evidence presented at the hearing was marshaled in favor of 
Hunter, and in 1949 there was no legal precedent for the 
disqualification of a state attorney,258 but the state had an additional 
                                                
252 Affidavit of Clyde H. Lockhart, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to 
Marion Cty.) (on file with author). 
253 Affidavits of support came from, among others, the former sheriff of Citrus 
County, the State Attorney for the Eighth Judicial Circuit, the former State 
Attorney for the Fifth Judicial Circuit, and the President of the Fifth Judicial 
Circuit’s Bar Association. See Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of 
Venue, Disqualification of State Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra 
note 193, at 22-23. 
254 Affidavit of Pat Whitaker, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to Marion 
Cty.) (on file with author). 
255 See, e.g., Affidavit of Charles S. Dean, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed 
to Marion Cty.) (on file with author) (relaying the story of the prosecution of a 
black man who killed a white man in which Hunter, unconvinced of the 
defendant’s guilt, asked the judge to enter a judgment of acquittal); Affidavit of 
Tim M. Sellar, Florida v. Irvin, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to Marion Cty.) (on file 
with author) (writing about a case in which Hunter successfully prosecuted the 
unpopular case of three white men who killed a black man). 
256 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State 
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 22. 
257 See FLA. STAT. § 90.19 (1951). As to the form of evidence utilized at a hearing: 
if the moving party uses affidavits, then the responding party may also use 
affidavits. Here, it did appear the moving party - the defense - used affidavits 
from defendants Irvin and Shepherd in support of their Motion to Disqualify 
State Attorney Hunter. Once the defense utilized affidavits, the State would be 
able to reply in kind. 
258 See Downs v. Moore, 801 So. 2d 906, 914 (Fla. 2001) (explaining that the 
current standard for disqualification of a prosecutor is a showing of substantial 
misconduct or actual prejudice); see also Kearse v. Florida, 770 So. 2d 1119, 
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argument that would ultimately carry the day. The state successfully 
raised the argument that only the Governor of Florida could disqualify 
a state attorney, and therefore the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to 
do so. Futch eagerly agreed with this premise and promptly denied the 
motion to disqualify the State Attorney. The defense did not argue this 
point at all, and in fact, they seemed to concede the matter.259 
Again, Futch’s decision to deny the motion was likely correct as 
the (now modern) legal standard for disqualification had not been met 
by the defense, but he opted to rely on the lack of jurisdiction 
argument instead. He could have been correct under either theory. 
Case law, statutes, and attorney general opinions from before the 
Groveland trials made clear that a trial judge could replace a state 
attorney upon a vacancy of the position, but no authority seemed to 
authorize a trial judge’s ability to remove a sitting state attorney from a 
case.260 Thus, while a Florida judge in 1952 may have had the legal 
authority to disqualify a state attorney upon proper evidence, the 
absolute availability of such a judicial action was not clear until 
1971.261 For either or both of these reasons, the motion to disqualify 
State Attorney Hunter was properly denied. 
Attorneys in Good Standing 
During the same December 6, 1951 pretrial hearing in which the 
motion to disqualify the State Attorney was properly denied, Judge 
Futch incorrectly barred two of the NAACP’s out-of-state attorneys 
from being able to practice pro hac vice during the hearing. When 
court convened at 10:00 A.M. in the Tavares courthouse, Alex 
                                                                                                               
1129 (Fla. 2000) (defining actual prejudice as a specific legal injury as opposed 
to a mere racial or societal prejudice, requiring the proponent to show something 
more than the mere appearance of impropriety). 
259 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State 
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 23-24. 
260 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 10 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1942) 
(asserting that, upon the disqualification or absence of a state attorney from 
office, the governor has the authority to substitute or replace said state attorney); 
FLA. STAT. § 32.72 (1951) (explaining that a judge has the authority to appoint a 
new prosecutor in any matter whenever there is a vacancy, a non-appointment, 
or otherwise). The statute does not appear to authorize the judiciary to disqualify 
or remove a state attorney. 
261 See generally Thompson v. Florida, 246 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1971) (lending a 
reasonable inference that a trial court does have the authority to disqualify a 
state attorney from a specific prosecution). 
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Akerman, Jr. began his second defense of the Groveland case by 
asking Judge Futch to allow two NAACP lawyers, Thurgood Marshall 
and Jack Greenberg, to be especially admitted to practice law in 
Florida as special counsel in this cause.262 This temporary pro hac vice 
admittance was a relatively common practice for members of the bars 
of other states whose practice in Florida would be limited to a singular 
or special appearance. Both Marshall and Greenberg, who practiced 
law primarily as appellate attorneys in front of the United States 
Supreme Court, were both members of the Maryland state bar. 263 
Under Florida statute 454.03, their admission to practice in Lake 
County for the limited purpose of the defense of the Groveland case, 
should have been immediately granted.264  However, State Attorney 
Hunter objected to their pro hac vice admission on the grounds that 
“they both represent the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, and [have] been responsible for the vicious, 
slanderous and libelous matter filed in this Court and circulated against 
this Court. . .”265 Despite Florida statute 454.03 seeming to offer no 
judicial discretion for Judge Futch to disallow special admittance to 
Marshall and Greenberg, he did so anyway, and his ruling appears 
wholly incorrect.266 In a silent twist however, Futch’s error seemed to 
have been quickly remedied. By the January 9, 1952 motion hearing 
                                                
262 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State 
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 1-2. 
263 Id. 
264 FLA. STAT. § 454.03 (1951) (codifying that “[a]ttorneys in good standing of 
other states may appear in particular cases in the courts of this state, when under 
the rules of comity of such states, attorneys from Florida are similarly permitted 
to appear; but attorneys of other states shall not do a local or general practice in 
this state . . .”). 
265 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Change of Venue, Disqualification of State 
Attorney, and Suppression of Evidence, supra note 193, at 2. 
266 Cf. CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 105. Ironically, the 1952 trial was not the first 
time Judge Futch encountered the question of pro hac vice practice during the 
course of the Groveland prosecutions. On the eve of the original 1949 trial, State 
Attorney Hunter asked the court to allow the appointment of his son Walter as a 
special assistant state attorney for purposes of assisting him during the trial. 
Futch granted the motion for the appointment. Seizing that opportunity, the 
defense immediately moved to allow NAACP attorney Franklin Williams, a 
member of the New York bar, to practice pro hac vice and assist the defense. 
Having just granted Hunter’s motion, Futch likely felt compelled to grant the 
defense’s as well, and he did. 
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date both Thurgood Marshall and Jack Greenberg had been admitted 
after a subsequent written motion by the defense, and both participated 
fully in that and all subsequent court events related to the Groveland 
case. 
A Jury of Their Peers 
While the 1949 Groveland convictions were overturned on appeal 
based on Cassell v. Texas violations involving improper grand jury 
selection procedures, the voir dire and selection of the two petit juries, 
both presided over by Judge Futch, seemed devoid of error. In spite of 
State Attorney Jesse Hunter’s habitually improper leading questions 
throughout the voir dire process, the defense never raised an 
objection.267 Judge Futch correctly excused jurors for cause when they 
indicated they did not fully appreciate the defendants’ Constitutional 
presumption of innocence,268 when they indicated they had already 
formed an opinion on the case, 269  when they were related to the 
prosecutor,270 and when they indicated they were acquaintances with 
the family of the alleged victim.271 In spite of the difficult task of 
selecting a jury in a county in which every single potential juror 
indicated they had already heard of the case,272 the 1952 trial only 
required fifty-three potential jurors to be questioned before both sides 
had agreed on a trial jury.273 Of the fifty-three potential jurors in the 
                                                
267 See, e.g., Trial Transcript at 256, Florida v. Shepherd, (D. Lake Cty. Fla. 1949) 
(on file with author). 
268 Judge Futch sustained a defense challenge for cause after a juror stated, “[W]ell, 
I don’t know as I could consider them innocent,” and sustained another after a 
prospective juror indicated it would require some evidence from the defense to 
remove his current opinion. See id. at 257, 407. 
269 See id. at 408 (noting an example of a challenge for cause granted when a 
prospective juror was unsure if he could set aside his preconceived opinions of 
the case); id. at 425, 430 (noting additional examples of prospective jurors who 
were properly excused for cause after indicating unwavering opinions based on 
newspaper articles). 
270 Id. at 440. 
271 Id. at 368. 
272 Brief of Appellant at 51, Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953). 
273 Brief of Appellee, supra note 187, at 4.  
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1952 voir dire, only five were African-American. 274  None were 
selected to serve.275 
A Fresh Complaint 
With juries selected, the evidentiary phases of the Groveland trials 
commenced. Upon the proper request, Judge Futch correctly read and 
invoked the rule of sequestration, which required all potential 
witnesses to remain outside the courtroom during the testimony of all 
other witnesses. 276  The most common and most basic testimonial 
evidentiary rulings placed before Judge Futch came in the form of 
objections to hearsay. To his credit, Judge Futch’s understanding and 
application of the rules of hearsay seemed solid.277 Throughout both 
trials, Futch ruled on several matters touching upon various 
applications of the hearsay rules, and while many were rather trivial, 
his rulings on those objections, whether entered by the state or the 
defense, were largely correct. 
The first of several major rulings during the evidence phase of the 
trial came in the form of a hearsay objection, and it came during the 
testimony of Willie Haven Padgett. During Willie Padgett’s direct 
examination he was asked by the state attorney what statements his 
wife had made to him upon his first contact with her after the alleged 
rape. The defense properly objected to this line of questioning as 
hearsay, and the state countered that such evidence should be admitted 
                                                
274 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 311. 
275 See generally Jury Trial Voir Dire Transcript at 1-266, Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 
2d 288 (Fla. 1953) (removed to Marion County). Of the five potential black 
jurors summonsed, two were struck peremptorily by the State, two were excused 
for cause based on pre-fixed opinions, and one was excused for cause based on 
his moral opposition to the death penalty. Id. 
276 See id. at 266-67 (explaining that the rule of sequestration, commonly called 
“The Rule” by practitioners, is a common law principle of witness exclusion 
which requires all trial witnesses to remain outside the courtroom during the 
evidentiary phase of a trial so that no one witness will have the benefit of 
hearing the testimony of another); see also Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 
459. 
277 See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 598. Ethel Thomas, the mother of 
deceased defendant Ernest Thomas, was asked to relay what her deceased son 
had told her when she told him to go home. The deceased party’s response, 
“[n]o,” was objected to as hearsay and properly overruled as non-hearsay under 
the common law res gestae exemption from Bowen v. Keen, 17 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 
1944). 
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under the fresh complaint exception to the hearsay rule.278 While the 
fresh complaint exception is now essentially extinct due to adverse 
statutory and case law authority,279 in 1949 the exception was well 
established and constituted competent evidence. This was especially 
well known in Florida’s fifth judicial circuit, as the seminal case on the 
matter stemmed from a Marion County case decided by the Florida 
Supreme Court just one year before. In the case of Custer v. Florida, 
the Florida high court ruled that evidence of a complaint of rape soon 
after the occurrence is admissible to rebut the inference of consent, but 
it is only the fact of the complaint itself, not the details of the rape, 
which is admissible.280 
Custer made clear that the fact that Norma Lee alleged a rape 
would be admissible, but her first human contact was with Lawrence 
Burtoft, not her husband. The defense contended this fact negated the 
applicability of the fresh complaint exception. Judge Futch disagreed, 
and allowed Willie Padgett to testify to his wife’s rape allegation.281 
Under the law of the time, Judge Futch was correct in doing so. The 
fresh complaint exception, as enunciated in Custer, did not necessarily 
require the complaint be made to the first person with whom a rape 
victim came into contact; the language of the case simply required the 
report be made soon after the occurrence.282 The contemporary legal 
treatise series American Jurisprudence acknowledged that delayed 
complaints were acceptable when supported by the circumstances, or 
when the victim was only in the presence of strangers. 283  In the 
Groveland opinion, the Florida Supreme Court explained that, “[f]rom 
the very nature of such an experience we think [Norma Lee Padgett’s] 
reply to her husband . . . without telling the first man she saw, a virtual 
if not a total stranger, was entirely natural and that the admission of the 
                                                
278 Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 472. 
279 See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.101 – 958 (1976). When Florida codified its rules of 
evidence in 1976, it recognized roughly thirty exceptions to the hearsay rule, but 
chose not to codify the fresh complaint exception; see also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (abrogating many of the statutory and common 
law exceptions to the hearsay rule in favor of a renewed emphasis on the right of 
confrontation of live witness testimony). 
280 Custer v. Florida, 34 So. 2d 100, 112 (Fla. 1947) (citing Ellis v. Florida, 6 So. 
768 (Fla. 1889)). 
281 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 277. 
282 Custer, 159 Fla. at 112.  
283 65 AM. JUR. 2D Rape § 63 (2015). 
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testimony did not violate that spirit of the [fresh complaint] rule.”284 
Sadly, this seems to be one of the few legal matters the Florida 
Supreme Court ruled on correctly in regard to its two Groveland 
opinions. Nonetheless, the opinion supports Judge Futch’s conclusion 
as well. 
Those Shoes Made Those Tracks 
Having shown a clear and accurate grasp of Florida’s common law 
hearsay rules, the next series of rulings encountered by Judge Futch 
came in the form of objections to three major items of physical 
evidence and the testimony surrounding them. Just as was the case 
with the various hearsay objections, Futch’s legal conclusions as to the 
physical evidentiary objections proved correct as well. It was in these 
two areas of the law that Judge Futch seemed to be the most accurate 
from the point of view of legal retrospection. 
The first item to be analyzed was “State’s Exhibit #1”, a dirty, lint 
covered handkerchief found at the location of the alleged rape, which 
was purported to belong to Norma Lee Padgett. Introduced during the 
direct examination of Lake County Deputy Sheriff James Yates, the 
soiled handkerchief was abandoned in a bushy thicket near the scene, 
and was located and recovered by Yates. The prosecution argued it 
was covered in similar lint to that found in the defendants’ vehicle.285 
The defense objected to its introduction as irrelevant and improperly 
authenticated. To this, Judge Futch responded tersely, “[l]et it be 
received.” 286  Overruling the objection on relevance grounds was 
simple, as the handkerchief, for all the reasons argued by the 
prosecution above, clearly satisfied the simple threshold for 
relevance.287 However, while Futch’s ruling on the relevance of the 
handkerchief was simple and correct, the portion of the defense’s 
                                                
284 Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 294 (1952). 
285 Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 537-539. 
286 Id. 
287 See FLA. STAT. § 90.401 (1976) (codifying the ancient common law doctrine of 
relevant evidence that considers evidence relevant if it “tend[s] to prove or 
disprove a material fact”). Clearly, the soiled handkerchief of the alleged victim, 
left at the scene of the offense, and covered in a substance consistent with that of 
the interior of the offenders’ vehicle, satisfies this provision. 
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objection to improper predicate or authentication requires greater 
analysis.288 
While the chain of custody aspect of authentication was 
unquestionably satisfied by the fact that Deputy Yates had collected 
the handkerchief at the scene, brought it into the courtroom, and 
identified it in open court, Deputy Yates would have had no 
knowledge of the fact that the handkerchief belonged to the alleged 
victim unless he was so informed by Norma Lee Padgett. Under this 
rationale, such testimony may have called for hearsay, or may have 
supported the defense objection to relevance. However, a hearsay 
analysis would have shown, that under 1949 common law, any such 
statement to Deputy Yates by Norma Lee indicating her possessory 
interest in the handkerchief would have been non-hearsay. Such a 
statement was non-hearsay because it was not to be offered for its 
truth, but rather to explain the actions of the listener, or rather why 
Deputy Yates collected that particular item of evidence.289 Lastly, even 
if Judge Futch had found the predicate to be lacking, and Deputy 
Yates’ testimony regarding the alleged victim’s interest in the 
handkerchief to be hearsay, the state could have simply recalled 
Norma Lee Padgett to the stand to lay the final piece of the predicate 
herself. Therefore, under any such analysis, the introduction of the 
handkerchief was proper. 
Following the proper admission of Norma Lee’s handkerchief, and 
still during the direct examination of Deputy Sheriff Yates, the state 
sought the introduction of the most contested, the most damning, and 
the most reprehensible item of physical evidence introduced during the 
course of the Groveland prosecutions. The centerpiece of Deputy 
Yates’ investigation into the Padgetts’ allegations was his taking, or 
creation, of plaster casts of tire marks290 and shoe prints291 from the 
scene of the alleged rape. From the moment these casts were first 
offered into evidence, controversy and tragedy closely followed. 
                                                
288 Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 539 (objecting on grounds of relevance and 
failure to lay an adequate foundation) . 
289 See FLA. STAT. § 90.801 (1976) (defining hearsay as a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted). 
290 See Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 540-551 (dealing with the introduction 
of the plaster tire casts). 
291 Id. at 556-58. 
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The defense objection to the tire and shoe casts came via multiple 
theories of exclusion. First, the defense objected that Deputy Yates 
lacked the necessary expertise to take or create such casts, and they 
even interrupted the state’s direct examination to voir dire Yates 
themselves to highlight his lack of formal forensic training.292 In spite 
of excellent legal work on the subject by the defense, Futch correctly 
dismissed their argument on this ground. Specifically, he was justified 
in finding that, even though Yates’ training on the subject was limited 
to having studied it from some books,293 the taking of the plaster casts 
“by pouring plaster paris into the tracks, letting it harden, and then 
lifting it out of the ground”294 was not a forensic skill that required 
education in an advanced scientific technique or specialized expertise. 
Given the rather elementary nature of the cast-making procedure, and 
its simple lay applications, this conclusion was likely correct. 
Secondly, as it related to the tire casts taken from the dirt road 
shoulder of the alleged rape location, the defense raised the argument 
of relevance. Specifically, they argued that the tracks “could have been 
made by hundreds of cars in Lake County with like treads or tires, and 
that the casts  didn’t tend to prove anything at all, let alone a material 
fact.”295 While this rationale is undoubtedly true, such an argument 
clearly goes to the weight of such evidence, and not to the 
admissibility. Judge Futch seems to have correctly understood this 
legal distinction, and was correctly unmoved by this avenue of the 
defendants’ objection. 
The last line of defense posited on the matter of the plaster casts 
was also the most successful, and it is in this area probable error on the 
part of Judge Futch exists. This theory of exclusion was centered on a 
line of Florida case law that limited the testimony of non-expert 
witnesses in evidentiary matters of comparison. By his own admission, 
Deputy Yates was not a scientific expert.296 Indeed, under Florida’s 
statutory requirements for expert witnesses in 1949, he could not 
legally be considered as such since he lacked a professional degree 
from a university or college, and he did not possess special 
                                                
292 Id. at 541-47. 
293 Id. at 542. 
294 Id. at 543. 
295 Id. at 540. 
296 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 335, 365 (confirming that Yates is not a 
scientific expert). 
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professional training and expertise in the applicable field.297 The state 
of Florida conceded this point. Given Yates’ lay witness status, his 
testimony would therefore be limited by three major Florida cases.298 
Namely, this line of cases stood for the proposition that a lay witness 
could describe the visible properties of comparison evidence, and 
could testify to their similar characteristics, but could not opine or 
conclude that both items of comparison were identical, the same, or 
from the same person.299 These conclusions, the court reasoned, fell 
within the province of the jury. Both sides seem to have acknowledged 
these proscriptions in their subsequent legal briefs,300 but Judge Futch 
did not correctly curtail Yates’ trial testimony so as to keep it within 
these parameters. To this end, Futch incorrectly allowed Yates to 
testify to the ultimate and impermissible conclusion that Walter Irvin’s 
shoes specifically made these distinct tracks.301 The defense properly 
objected at the time of the testimony, and properly raised the matter on 
appeal. 
Judge Futch’s failed application of the Ferguson-Johnson-Alford 
case law was clearly improper, and was undoubtedly prejudicial to the 
defense. This assignment of error is true in spite of the fact that the 
Florida Supreme Court validated Judge Futch’s incorrect ruling by 
extending the Ferguson-Johnson-Alford rule to accommodate for 
Futch’s error in the record of this case.302 Being saved by a subsequent 
and questionable extension of the law by a higher court does not 
change our analysis and miraculously render the trial court’s prior 
                                                
297 FLA. STAT. § 90.23 (1949). 
298 Ferguson v. Florida, 28 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1946); Johnson v. Florida, 46 So. 154 
(Fla. 1908); Alford v. Florida, 36 So. 436 (Fla. 1904). 
299 See generally Ferguson, 28 So. 2d at 427; Johnson, 46 So. at 154; Alford, 36 So. 
at 436. 
300 In both the State and Defense Appellate Briefs to the Florida Supreme Court 
following the 1952 trial of Walter Irvin, both sides agreed on the current status 
of the law as controlled by Ferguson, Johnson, and Alford. See Brief of 
Appellant, supra note 272, at 104; see also Brief of Appellee, supra note 187, at 
10. 
301 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 272, at 104. 
302 Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 296 (1953) (reasoning that “[w]e do not think it 
would be logical to hold that in the circumstances a witness could say that in his 
comparison of shoes and tires with the tracks, he found at the scene, the imprints 
bore precisely the same characteristic marks as the objects, but that reversible 
error would result from his stating the conclusion based on these observations 
that the objects made these imprints”). 
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ruling correct. In this situation, both in 1949 and 1952, Judge Futch 
was bound by the rule as laid out in Ferguson-Johnson-Alford, and his 
failure to constrain Yates’ testimony to it constituted a harmful error at 
the time. Here, two wrongs still do not make a right. In conclusion, the 
admission into evidence of the tire and shoe casts, as well as the 
testimony regarding their similar characteristics, both over defense 
objections, was correct. However, Futch’s allowance of Yates’ 
ultimate opinion attributing the shoe prints to Walter Irvin himself was 
a grave trial error under the controlling law of the day. Of course, the 
confirmation of the fact in later years that Yates had forged the shoe 
prints, a fact of which we hope Judge Futch was unaware in 1949, 
casts yet another tragic shadow over the whole of the Groveland story. 
Tell the Truth for Once in Your Life 
Having seen Judge Truman Futch to be relatively solid in his 
application of the hearsay rules, and accurate in all but one ruling in 
the area of physical evidence, we now turn our attention to Judge 
Futch’s hit and miss analysis regarding impeachment and character 
evidence. In these rulings, Futch was inconsistent and often incorrect. 
From the standpoint of legal scholarship, this seems to be the area in 
which his rulings were weakest. 
Judge Futch began his back and forth encounters with character 
evidence objections in the form of the defense impeachment of state 
witness Henry Singer. Mr. Singer, a member of Groveland’s African-
American community, testified to defendant Charles Greenlee’s 
involvement in the illicit neighborhood gambling practice of bolita, 
also known as Cuba. The defense sought to cross examine Mr. Singer 
on his own involvement in these illegal games, but Singer had never 
been convicted in court for such an act, so Judge Futch properly 
sustained the state’s objection as it constituted improper character 
evidence.303 Immediately thereafter, the defense correctly impeached 
Singer with a prior court conviction for the offense of impersonating 
an officer.304 
                                                
303 Trial Transcript, supra note 267, at 593-94; FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1949) 
(instructing that impeachment by evidence of prior criminal activity must only 
be in the form of a court conviction). 
304 While Florida Statute section 90.610 (2015) does not permit the introduction of 
prior misdemeanor offenses for impeachment purposes, the 1949 version of the 
statute made no such distinction.  See FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1949). 
2016 The Law of the Groves 249 
Faced with essentially the same scenario but with the parties 
reversed, Judge Futch stumbled through the testimony of witness 
Lawrence Burtoft during Walter Irvin’s 1952 Marion County retrial. 
Burtoft had not testified in the original 1949 Lake County trial, but his 
knowledge of inconsistencies in Norma Lee Padgett’s testimony made 
him a crucial defense witness during the retrial. Having undertaken 
great lengths to secure his attendance at the 1952 retrial, in spite of his 
being stationed with the United States Marine Corp in North Carolina, 
his testimony was essential to the 1952 defense of Walter Irvin. It was 
the substance of Burtoft’s testimony that Hunter had refused to 
disclose in 1949, and it was Burtoft’s testimony that now formed a key 
pillar in Irvin’s defense strategy. 305  On cross examination, State 
Attorney Hunter sought to impeach Burtoft with the fact that the Lake 
County Sheriff’s Office and the Burtoft family were engaged in a bit 
of friction over the Burtoft family’s ownership of a local dance hall 
where alcohol was sold.306 The defense objected, and Hunter argued 
that such evidence was relevant to show the witness’ bias against local 
law enforcement.307 Understanding that since the days of the English 
common law evidence of bias has long been allowed,308 Judge Futch 
correctly overruled the defendant’s objection. Just minutes later, 
Hunter was growing increasingly frustrated with Burtoft’s testimony, 
so when Burtoft responded to an inquiry by saying he had helped 
Norma Lee, Hunter fired back, “[d]on’t you think you would be 
helping her more if you told the truth for once in your life?” The 
defense immediately objected and moved to strike what was clearly an 
impermissible and argumentative question, but Judge Futch overruled 
their objection.309  While such a trite comment was likely of small 
                                                
305  Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 388. Specifically, Mr. Burtoft testified that 
although Norma Lee told him she was abducted, she did not mention the fact 
that she was raped. Additionally, and most importantly, she clearly indicated to 
Mr. Burtoft that she could not identify her assailants. 
306 Id. at 389. 
307 Id. 
308 See Pandula v. Fonseca, 199 So. 358, 360 (Fla. 1940) (explaining “[i]t is error to 
exclude questions touching interest, motives, animus, or the statute of a witness 
in a suit.”); see also Tervin v. Florida, 20 So. 551, 554 (Fla. 1896) (stating “[t]he 
fact sought to be elicited tended to show the bias of the witness towards the 
defendant, which it was competent for the State to show”). 
309   Trial Transcript, supra note 305, at 396-397. 
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consequence amidst such a trial, this was certainly an objection that 
Judge Futch should have sustained. 
The last matter of impeachment evidence to examine, which was 
presented to Judge Futch during the cross examination of Deputy 
Sheriff James Yates, was also the trial’s most crucial. Due to Yates’ 
presence at, and alleged involvement in, the State Road 19 shooting 
which claimed the life of Samuel Shepherd and seriously injured 
Walter Irvin, Alex Akerman took a brave stab at the deputy while he 
on the stand. Is it true, Akerman asked Yates, “that the Defendant 
Walter Irvin has accused you and the Sheriff of Lake County, Florida 
of attempting to murder him?” The state objected, the defense argued 
the question was relevant to show the witness’ bias, and Judge Futch 
sustained the state’s objection. As discussed above, Florida cases such 
as Pandula v. Fonseca and Tervin v. Florida had long held that 
questions that probe at witness bias are admissible, 310  but such 
inquiries should not digress into collateral matters which may be 
uncalled for by the circumstances.311 
On appeal the Florida Supreme Court agreed with Judge Futch’s 
exclusion of this far-flung question by reasoning that if such 
questioning was permitted, any defendant “could make an accusation, 
however idle, against a prospective adverse witness, then use his own 
charge, even if wholly unfounded, to his advantage.”312  While the 
Florida Supreme Court was suspiciously cavalier with this hugely 
important matter, further characterizing its legal credibility in the 
Groveland matter as questionable, the point of disallowing bias 
impeachment with wholly unfounded allegations does hold some 
merit. Looking at this inquiry in a light most favorable to Judge Futch, 
the attempted murder allegations levied by Irvin against Yates and 
McCall were, from a purely calloused legal standpoint, still technically 
unfounded. Indeed, at that point the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a 
federal grand jury, the state attorney’s office, and a coroner’s inquest 
had all failed to return affirmative findings of culpability as to Yates or 
McCall in the matter of the shooting of Irvin and Shepherd. While 
these findings were likely influenced greatly by local prejudice, the 
cold fact remained that, at the time, Futch was dealing with an 
unfounded allegation. Regardless of technicalities or legal minutia 
                                                
310 Pandula, 199 So. at 360; Tervin, 20 So. at 554. 
311 Tully v. Florida, 68 So. 934, 937 (Fla. 1915). 
312 Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 295 (1953) (emphasis added). 
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however, the defense inquiry of Deputy Yates into the attempted 
murder of the trial defendant was likely substantiated enough to have 
allowed its admission, and its exclusion probably contributed to a very 
real miscarriage of justice. Futch’s exclusion of this evidence was 
likely driven more by local allegiances and personal feelings than by 
any whisper of the law. Therefore, it may be argued that it was Judge 
Futch’s own bias that improperly precluded the evidence of Deputy 
Yates. 
Allow the Jury to be Carried to the Scene 
Just before Walter Irvin’s 1952 defense team announced rest, Alex 
Akerman made a rather unusual request of the court. Due to 
uncertainties in the testimonies of the state’s witnesses regarding the 
actual location of the alleged rape, the defense hoped to raise doubt in 
the jurors’ minds concerning the proper county of venue for the 
offense. Testimony from Deputy Sheriff James Yates placed the 
offense occurring so close to the Lake-Sumter county line that a 
Sumter County road sign was used as a visual point of reference in 
Yates’ investigation. For his part, however, Yates was clear that his 
investigation revealed the offense did in fact occur in Lake County. 
Hoping to seize on a possible discrepancy however, Walter Irvin’s 
defense team asked Judge Futch to allow the jury to be carried to the 
scene of the alleged crime.313 Specifically, they were making a motion 
for a jury view. Without hesitation, and without any announced 
analysis, Judge Futch correctly denied the motion. 
“When, in the opinion of the court,” according to Florida Statute 
918.05, “it is proper that the jury should view the place where the 
offense appears to have been committed . . . it may order the jury . . . 
to be conducted in a body to such place.”314 Statutory language that 
included words like opinion and may would seem to indicate that great 
latitude was granted to the trial judge in making a determination for a 
jury view, and the case law interpreting this statute confirms this 
perspective. 315  Thus, Futch’s decision on the matter would not be 
                                                
313 Trial Transcript, supra note 305, at 440. 
314 FLA. STAT. § 918.05 (1951). 
315 See, e.g., Panama City v. Eytchison, 184 So. 490, 492 (Fla. 1938) (declaring that 
“[t]he time, circumstances, and conditions under which a view by the jury will 
be permitted are at all times in the discretion of the trial court”). 
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disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion,316 and the only conclusive 
geographical evidence presented at the trial supported the fact that the 
offense occurred in Lake County. 
Indeed, even Yates’ sketchy road-sign testimony would have been 
enough to justify Futch’s denial of the motion, but there were also 
several provisions of law that would have supported his conclusion as 
well. First, unlike proof of the elements of the crime or the 
identification of the defendant, venue did not have to be proven to the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Rather, in 1952, the legal 
standard of proof for venue was the much more modest standard of 
reasonable inference.317 Secondly, even if the location of the actual 
rape was unclear, it was undisputed that the initial abduction site was 
in Lake County. Under the common law doctrine of res gestae, which 
would view an abduction and subsequent rape as part of a common 
sequence of events, it could be argued that venue was proper in the 
county where the offense began. This position was supported by 
Florida’s venue statutes of the day, which provided that where several 
acts are requisite to the commission of an offense, venue is proper in 
any county in which any of such acts occurred.318 Under any or all of 
these various theories, Judge Futch’s decision to deny the defendant’s 
motion for jury view was either correct, or well within his discretion. 
Bring the Defendant Back to the Stand 
By the time court was adjourned for the evening on February 13, 
1952, the defense had called three witnesses of their own, including 
Walter Irvin himself, and they had rested their case. The next morning, 
Walter Irvin’s retrial reconvened for its final day. When court was 
called to order at 9:30 A.M., Assistant State Attorney A.P. Buie 
shocked the court and the defense when he announced, “the State 
requests the right to bring the Defendant Walter Irvin back to the stand 
for further cross examination.” The defense quickly objected. Perhaps 
                                                
316 See Tully, 68 So. 934 (explaining the standard on review for motions for jury 
view is a clear abuse of discretion). 
317 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 446. 
318 See FLA. STAT. § 910.05 (1951); see also FLA. STAT. § 932.04 (1951). When an 
offense is committed in one state but acts leading to its commission occurred 
within another state, venue is proper in either state. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 910.04 
(1951). When a defendant receives aid in one county to effectuate an offense, 
but consummates the offense in another county, venue is proper in either county. 
Id. 
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sensing the storm he had walked into, Buie quickly backtracked on his 
request by stating, “[w]e do not insist on it; we just have one question 
to ask him, but it’s within this Court’s discretion.”319  In response, 
Akerman asked Judge Futch to excuse the jury, and after they had left 
the courtroom, the defense asked for a mistrial. 320  Judge Futch 
sustained the objection, but denied the motion for mistrial.321 
Judge Futch was undoubtedly correct in sustaining the defendant’s 
objection to being called as a witness by the prosecution in his own 
trial. Both the United States Constitution and the Florida Statutes 
clearly forbade such an act, as both specifically protect against 
compelling a citizen to be a witness against himself.322 Indeed, the 
right to silence is one of the greatest fundamental concepts of the 
American legal system. Under both statutory and case law authority 
the prosecution was entirely out of bounds in undertaking this request, 
and to do so in the presence of the jury made the matter even more 
shameful.323 Judge Futch, using more words than at seemingly any 
other point in the trials, declared, “the objection is good I think and is 
sustained.”324 No doubt, the objection was good. 
The harder legal analysis comes in the form of examining Judge 
Futch’s denial for a mistrial based on this improper act by the 
prosecution, in the presence of the jury. Assistant State Attorney 
Buie’s timid retraction did not make the situation any less harmful, as 
the jury had already heard both statements, and as the southern lawyers 
of the day might have said, “that bell can’t be un-rung.” The issue 
                                                
319 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 446. 
320 Id. 
321 Id. at 445-46. 
322 U.S. CONST. amend. V (declaring “[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself”);  FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1951) 
(stating  no accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against 
himself). 
323 See FLA. STAT. 918.09 (1951) (instructing nor shall any prosecuting attorney be 
permitted before the jury or court to comment on the failure of the accused to 
testify on his own behalf) (emphasis added); Rowe v. Florida, 98 So. 613, 618 
(Fla. 1924) (holding that “calling the attention of the jury, by the prosecuting 
officer of the State, to the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf, it 
matters not how adroitly he may attempt to evade the command of the statute, or 
how innocently it may be done, comes within the exception and deprives the 
defendant of the protection the statute was intended to secure, and of his 
constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial”).  
324 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 446. 
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presented to Judge Futch, while clearly harmful, was also unique. The 
case of Rowe v. Florida and its early 20th century progeny all dealt 
with cases where, factually, the defendant never took the stand on his 
own behalf.325 This case, in which a defendant who had taken the 
stand and the State sought to re-call him, seemed to be a matter of first 
impression. If these facts were consistent with Rowe, Judge Futch 
would have been required to grant the mistrial, as the Florida high 
court had determined that no trial court remedy would cure such an 
impermissible comment. In Rowe, however, the defendant never 
testified at all. 
The fact that Walter Irvin had testified on his own behalf, and then 
the state improperly sought his return to the witness stand, perhaps 
takes the Groveland case out of the control of Rowe, and places it on 
its own. Without question, this situation was factually unique, and to 
seek a mistrial in 1952 meant asking the judge to step very far out onto 
a very slim branch. Florida’s pre-1952 case law greatly cautioned trial 
judges against granting mistrials, and the case law clearly supported a 
presumption against them. In this area, wide judicial discretion was 
afforded, and mistrials were only to be granted for matters of 
manifest326 or absolute327 necessity. “The granting of a mistrial,” wrote 
the Florida Supreme Court in Perry v. Florida, “should be only for a 
specified fundamental or prejudicial error . . . of such a nature as will 
vitiate the result.” 328  The error here would certainly have been 
fundamental, as per Rowe, but perhaps for the fact that the defendant 
had already testified. If the error was something less than fundamental, 
and something more akin to merely improper, the Perry court advised, 
“the proper procedure is for the defendant to request the court to 
instruct the jury to disregard such objectionable remarks, and not that a 
mistrial be entered by the court. . .”329 Certainly under today’s more 
cautious approach to improper prosecutorial comments on a 
defendant’s right to remain silent, such an error would be deemed 
                                                
325 Rowe, 98 So. at 618 (noting that where the defendant did not testify at trial and 
the prosecution commented on that failure, reversal was the only remedy). 
326 Florida ex rel. Wilson v. Lewis, 55 So. 2d 118, 119 (Fla. 1951). 
327 Florida ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 23 So. 2d 484, 484 (Fla. 1945) (explaining 
that the power to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury should be done with 
great care and caution). 
328 Perry v. Florida, 200 So. 525, 527 (Fla. 1941). 
329 Id. 
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fundamental and a mistrial would readily be granted. Whether this 
should have risen to a mistrial in 1952, however, is a tight call. For 
guidance we might note that neither the United States nor Florida 
Supreme Courts addressed the matter on appeal, but while their silence 
is persuasive, it is not definitive. Given the careful protections afforded 
a defendant’s right to be free from adverse comments on his silence—
protections firmly enunciated by 1952— the author concludes that 
Judge Futch should have granted a mistrial under these circumstances. 
In the interests of practicality, however, we might safely and sadly 
conclude that the awarding of a third trial would simply have resulted 
in the same tragic outcome. 
The State Calls Sheriff Willis V. McCall 
The most controversial, most beloved, and most hated man in the 
entire Groveland saga had not been called as a witness at any point in 
the two trials concerning the greatest criminal investigation to ever 
take place in his jurisdiction. But on the afternoon of February 14, 
1952, just before the prosecution intended to announce rest in its 
rebuttal case, they made another surprising announcement. The state of 
Florida called Willis V. McCall to the stand.330 Presumably, the state 
intended to utilize McCall as a rebuttal character witness to offset the 
testimony of defense witness Lawrence Burtoft—namely, to testify to 
Burtoft’s reputation for dishonesty within the community, and his 
family’s contentious dealings with Lake County law enforcement due 
to their operation of an alcohol-serving dance hall. If Hunter intended 
to utilize McCall’s testimony for any other purposes, we shall never 
know. Two questions after he was sworn in to testify, the defense 
objected to McCall’s ability to serve as a witness. Their argument was 
based on the fact that, due to his position as sheriff, McCall had been 
present in the courtroom working as a bailiff throughout the whole of 
the proceedings, and therefore his testimony would be in violation of 
the rule of sequestration that Judge Futch had properly imposed at the 
outset of the trial.331 State Attorney Hunter argued that “the Rule,” by 
                                                
330 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 452. 
331 Id. at 452-453 (arguing against the calling of Sheriff McCall and the defense 
objection to same); Id. at 266-267 (explaining the rule of sequestration, 
commonly called “The Rule,” was a common law principle of witness exclusion 
which requires all trial witnesses to remain outside the courtroom during the 
evidentiary phase of a trial so that no one witness will have the benefit of 
hearing the testimony of another). 
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local custom, did not apply to law enforcement officers, but Judge 
Futch correctly sustained the defendant’s objection, and Sheriff 
McCall stepped down from the stand and returned quietly to his 
post.332 
 Why Sheriff McCall was never called earlier in the trial 
proceedings, or asked to remain outside the courtroom so as to 
preserve his eligibility to testify, will perhaps forever remain a well-
kept secret of trial strategy for both sides. Likely, both parties viewed 
him as a potential time bomb that might explode unwittingly in the 
hands of the questioner. His testimony would certainly have carried 
great weight for the prosecution, but the risk of exposing him to 
defense cross examination, especially on the matter of the shooting of 
defendants Shepherd and Irvin, likely made him a dangerous 
commodity on the stand. Likewise, the defense may forever regret 
objecting to his testimony and wish they had seized the opportunity to 
cross-examine the most contentious figure in this twisted drama; or, 
they may be relieved that the powerful figure was left guarding the 
back door. In either case, it is reasonable to assume that both sides 
equally feared what McCall may have said, and as a result, elected to 
leave the slumbering giant at rest. 
Couched in Different Language 
After both sides had rested their cases, but before beginning 
closing arguments, Judge Futch finalized the compilation of the jury 
instructions which would be read and provided to the jury. The 
purpose of jury instructions is to advise the trial jury of the applicable 
laws relevant to their deliberations. The Florida Supreme Court did not 
adopt a uniformed set of standard, or pattern, jury instructions until 
1981. During the days of the Groveland trials, the task of compiling 
the jury instructions landed on the trial judge to perform on a case-by-
case basis. In addition to the inclusion of the necessary and basic 
instructions on the elements of the offense, the burdens of proof, the 
presumption of innocence, the definition of reasonable doubt and 
several others, the defense sought the inclusion of three special jury 
instructions. These special requested instructions covered the legal 
topics of the defense of alibi, the situation of a notorious case, and the 
special scrutiny of the testimony of a rape victim. 333  These three 
                                                
332 Id. 452-53. 
333 Handwritten Document on Legal-Size paper attached to the Record on Appeal, 
Irvin v. Florida, (D. Fla. 1952) (removed to Marion Cty.) (on file with author). 
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special instructions were hand-scrawled on a long piece of legal paper 
and presented to Judge Futch for his consideration. 
The only one of the three special defense instructions Judge Futch 
agreed to give was the special requested instruction on the defense of 
alibi. 334  The instruction on the alibi defense was proper, and was 
supported by the facts adduced at trial. Judge Futch was correct to give 
it. The remaining two requested instructions were refused, and these 
decisions were also correct. Judge Futch did not give the requested 
instructions on notorious case335 or rigid scrutiny for the testimony of a 
rape accusatrix336 since the basic set of instructions that was given 
adequately addressed the same concerns of law.337 When the standard 
instruction sufficiently covers a legal matter, it is proper to refuse a 
special instruction on that same issue.338 As such, Judge Futch’s denial 
                                                
334 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 527.  “Defendant’s Requested Instruction #2 – 
Given – The defendant, under his plea of not guilty, sets up as a defense what is 
known in law as alibi, which means that the defendant was not there when the 
crime charged was committed, and consequently did not do it. Id. If from the 
evidence in this case you have a reasonable doubt as to the alibi—that is to say, 
whether the defendant was there or not—then you should give him the benefit of 
such reasonable doubt, and find him not guilty.” Id. 
335 Handwritten Document on Legal-Size paper attached to the Record on Appeal, 
supra note 333. “Gentlemen of the Jury, this has been and is a very notorious 
case, and there has been more or less excitement over it, and that feeling may 
possibly have crept into the trial to some extent. I am not saying that it has, but 
for fear that it has and in abundance of caution, that nothing but justice may be 
done, I deem it my duty to instruct you and caution you, against convicting the 
defendant though prejudice or upon insufficient evidence and to caution you that 
in your deliberations you should not be influenced one whit by what is 
commonly called public sentiment. In other words you must consider the 
evidence that has been given you on the witness stand and that alone in arriving 
at your verdict.”  
336 Cf. Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 521. “You, gentlemen, are the judges of 
the credibility of the witnesses who have testified in the case, and of the weight 
and sufficiency of the evidence. To determine what weight you give the 
testimony of a witness . . . you are to consider the manner and demeanor of the 
witness upon the stand, the bias, prejudice or interest of the witness, if any 
appear, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the testimony, the probability 
or improbability of it being true, and the intelligence of the witness.” But cf. id.  
“In a case of this kind where no other person was an immediate witness to the 
alleged act the testimony of the prosecutrix should be rigidly scrutinized.” 
337 See, e.g., Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 520.  
338 Blackwell v. Florida, 86 So. 224, 226 (1920) (stating that “it is not error to 
refuse to give instructions that have already been given substantially, though 
couched in different language”). 
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of their inclusion was correct. In fact, it might be noted that after the 
trial concluded and while awaiting appeal, Alex Akerman was already 
aware of the propriety of the rulings. In an April 1952 letter to defense 
co-council Jack Greenberg, Akerman wrote: “I enclose copies of the 
requested Instructions [which were refused] with citation noted on 
each Instruction. From a study of the cited cases you will see that our 
position is not too strong.”339 
By a Technicality He Stopped Me 
The last major objection of the trial, and one in which the defense 
also sought the declaration of a mistrial, came during the prosecution’s 
closing arguments. In substance this event was linked to the defense’s 
objection to Sheriff McCall’s ability to be called as a state witness due 
to the rule of sequestration, and Judge Futch’s correctly sustaining that 
objection. During his summation, State Attorney Hunter asked defense 
witness Lawrence Burtoft if he had it in for the Law Enforcement 
agencies of Florida and Lake County, and claimed, that due to a 
technicality, the defense prevented him from proving the affirmative 
nature of the response to this question. 340  Hunter was, of course, 
referring to the fact that he attempted to call Sheriff McCall as a 
witness to rebut Burtoft’s testimony, but was denied the ability to do 
so because of the invocation of the rule of sequestration. The defense 
immediately objected to this argument, asked that the jury be excused, 
and then sought the remedy of a mistrial. When Judge Futch denied 
the motion for mistrial, Akerman asked that the court instruct the jury 
to disregard the statement as made by the States Attorney. As to both 
requests, Judge Futch simply replied, “[t]he motion is denied.”341 
Just as was the case with the state’s improper attempt to re-call 
Walter Irvin to the witness stand, Judge Futch erred again in his failure 
to deliver a curative instruction to the jury regarding this comment as 
well.342 Even the Florida Supreme Court, who had essentially rubber-
stamped every issue in the two trials thus far, saw fit to call this act 
irregular, and agreed the “remark should not have been made, and 
                                                
339 Letter from Alex Akerman, Jr. to Jack Greenberg, Re: Groveland Case (April 
13, 1952) (on file with author). 
340 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 508. 
341 Id. 
342 Perry v. Florida, 200 So. 525, 527 (Fla. 1941).  
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having been, the court should have instructed the jury to disregard 
it.”343 
As to the issue of granting a mistrial however, the Florida Supreme 
Court agreed with the trial court. They found no need for a mistrial, 
and found any such errors that were committed to be harmless.344 Just 
as was the case in the request for a mistrial based on the State’s 
improper attempt to re-call Walter Irvin to the witness stand, the 
accuracy of Judge Futch’s decision to deny the motion for a mistrial 
here was a true coin-flip on the spectrum of correctness. There is little 
doubt that appellate courts were much more forgiving of improper 
arguments of counsel during the early 20th century than they are 
today. From the case of Dunlop v. United States we can gauge the 
temperature of the United States Supreme Court in the years before the 
Groveland case when they wrote: 
There is no doubt that, in the heat of argument, counsel 
do occasionally make remarks that are not justified by 
the testimony, and which are, or may be, prejudicial to 
the accused . . . If every remark made by counsel 
outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, 
comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the 
ardor of advocacy, and in the excitement of trial, even 
the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried 
away by this temptation.345 
While this rather forgiving tone would not be found in a recent 
court opinion, perhaps the closest precedent to the case at bar came in 
the form of Berger v. United States. 346  In the Berger case the 
prosecutor also criticized the technicalities of the rules of trial 
procedure, and in a similar effort to insinuate to the jury why he failed 
to prove a certain matter, he explained that he was bound by “the rules 
of the game, and that he had to play within those rules.” Because the 
Supreme Court found the case against Mr. Berger was weak and that 
the pronounced and persistent comments by the prosecution were 
improper, Berger’s conviction was overturned on appeal.347 
                                                
343 Irvin v. Florida, 66 So. 2d 288, 295 (1953). 
344 See id.  
345 Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897). 
346 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
347 Id. at 88-89. 
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Using Berger as the polestar, we may say that an improper 
comment by the prosecutor regarding technicalities or impediments 
within the rules of trial procedure should result in a mistrial if the 
overall evidence in the case was weak and/or the prosecutor’s 
improper comments were numerous. While the modern criminal 
attorney would certainly find both of these prongs met within the 
Groveland trials, we cannot simply impose a modern-day analysis onto 
the courtrooms of 1952. Modern or ancient biases aside however, the 
best argument to support a finding of correctness here is in the fact that 
all aspects of the complained of technicality did occur in the presence 
of the jury. While error occurring in front of the jury is usually a 
profound negative, here it may have been a positive. Because the jury 
had heard the Rule of Sequestration invoked, and they heard the 
defense object to it being violated by placing a man on the stand who 
the jurors saw standing in the courtroom with them for three straight 
days, we may conclude that Hunter’s reference to this technicality was 
nothing that the average juror would not have been able to surmise for 
themselves. If this is true, then Futch’s denial of the motion for 
mistrial was correct under the rather stringent presumptions against the 
granting of mistrials that were in effect at the time. If not, then Futch’s 
denial was the second very serious error during the trials of this case. 
With Any Innocent Man’s Blood on My Soul 
As the second Groveland trial came to an end in Marion County, 
four attorneys, one of which would go on to be a United States 
Supreme Court justice, made closing arguments to the all-male, all-
white Ocala jury. All four attorneys made references and arguments of 
fact and law that would truly appall the modern trial lawyer. For more 
than 120 pages of court transcripts one can read a series of arguments 
replete with more improper comments than one could find in a modern 
law school textbook on that very subject. The only comment objected 
to by either side, however, was Hunter’s technicality comment. 
Because these comments went without objection at trial, Judge Futch 
was not asked to make rulings on their propriety. They went 
subsequently unaddressed through two appeals. Therefore, it would be 
fruitless to undertake an analysis of these comments in this Article 
since neither the parties nor the court saw it fit to concern themselves 
with these issues at the time. To that end, the comments made by both 
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sides in the Groveland court saga are mere footnotes, both in trial 
history, and in this Article.348 
                                                
348 Trial Transcript, supra note 55, at 457 (violating the Golden Rule by asking the 
jury what they would have done in they were in that circumstance); id. at 509 
(violating the Golden Rule by starting a question in the following manner: “Now 
gentlemen, would you have told him, or would your wife have told him . . .”); 
id. at 471 (inserting personal information about himself, Buie stated, “I have 
been in the Army myself . . . I was engaged in that kind of work in the Army, 
and I participated in many Court Martials . . .”); id. at 481 (replying to Buie’s 
improper insertion of personal information about himself by doing the same, 
Marshall proclaimed, “I too know about them, I have been in many many court 
martial proceedings . . . all the way from here to Korea and back”); id. at 499-
500 (speaking extensively about his personal experiences, Attorney Ackerman 
said, “I want to give you a little bit of my experience in regard to my personal 
conduct in undertaking the defense of this case . . . I did not want to defend this 
case, I don’t want to do it now . . . I am now in the Navy of the United States . . . 
I knew what the criticism against me would be . . .”); id. at 501 (improperly 
inserting his personal beliefs, Ackerman professed that when he told Irvin to tell 
nothing but the truth, that he believed that Walter Irvin has done just that; “I 
believe that he has told you the truth from this stand”); id. at 505 (speaking of 
his career experience, Hunter explained, “I have never prosecuted a man in my 
career who I believed to be innocent. . .” ); id. at 518 (improperly sharing 
irrelevant personal experiences and beliefs, State Attorney Hunter states, 
“[g]entlemen, I have been seriously ill . . . I have been stricken with a fatal 
disease . . . I may soon have to meet the Almighty, and I don’t want to meet the 
Almighty with any innocent man’s blood on my soul, and Gentlemen, I don’t 
believe that I will ever do so. . .”); id. at 472 (improperly speaking on the safety 
of the community, Buie opined, “[g]entlemen, until we get back to the place 
where our grandfathers started out with the law . . . I don’t know what will 
happen to this county”); id. at 517 (lecturing improperly, Hunter explained that, 
“in a case of this kind, every sacred tradition of your life and my life, and of our 
civilization is at stake”); id. (explaining improperly his personal beliefs about 
the safety of Lake County, Hunter stated, “I want to leave this county and this 
State in such a condition that no bunch of men can come in and snatch up your 
wife or your daughter and carry her out in the woods and rape her”); id. at 474 
(attacking a witness at the trial, Buie exclaimed, “the statement that [the witness] 
made is the most asinine statement that I have ever heard before in a Court of 
the State of Florida, and yet he sits up here and expects you to believe any such 
junk as that”); id. at 510 (insulting another at the trial, Hunter shouted, “the 
other one was a damn liar”); id. at 516 (offending the fundamental concept of 
equality and personally attacking a race of people, Hunter asked, “Isn’t that just 
the colored way of thinking?”); id. at 475 (imposing his personal beliefs that law 
enforcement has no interest in the outcome of the case, Buie asked the jury, 
“[n]ow, are all these [officers] liars; have they any interest at all in the outcome 
of this case, have they any reason to lie on this stand, and swear to a lie?”). Buie 
immediately supplements the question with his personal belief, “[n]o, 
gentlemen, I don’t believe they would.” Id.; see id. at 475 (introducing prior 
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PART III: CONCLUSIONS 
The Whittler 
For anyone who has ever stepped into a small-town southern 
courthouse, it is not hard for imaginations to still see Judge Truman 
“the Whittler” Futch on the bench. Clothed in a black robe, he is 
sitting in a large chair, leaning back in it as far as the laws of gravity 
will allow. He is turned at such an angle so that the whole of his body 
is turned away from the courtroom, and his eyes and hands are fixed 
on his incessant task of whittling down old scraps of wooden fences. 
His legal rulings are generally confined to four words or less. 
But, we do not need our imaginations to see his results. Those are 
well preserved in orders, transcripts, and opinions. Those are matters 
of public record. From those we have learned that Judge Futch, despite 
the historiography, seemed to be largely correct in his legal rulings 
through the whole of these two trials. For whatever his reasons or 
rationales, none of which did he espouse upon verbally, he was 
overwhelmingly correct in his rulings on pretrial motions, objections 
to hearsay, and applications of physical evidence. These examples are 
matters of the cold application of facts to law, and they were 
impartially governed by the fairly conservative case law of his day. 
However, Judge Futch was weak on matters of character evidence and 
impeachment, and he bordered on the overtly erroneous when trial 
matters delved into improper comments made by the prosecution. 
Here, there could be no cold application of the law. These issues 
touched on matters of friendship, community, personality, bias, 
prejudice, and conscience. In these areas, where a judge needs to be at 
his strongest, Judge Futch showed his weakness. Like the scraps of 
wooden shavings scattered under his bench would attest to, Judge 
Futch was sharp and focused when the wood was hard and the 
substance firm, but as the pieces narrowed into individual splinters and 
the blade inched too close to human skin, he cast the piece to the floor 
and began the process anew. 
                                                                                                               
evidence of bad character, which is now universally irrelevant unless the defense 
opens the door, Buie informed the jury that, “this boy here has received a 
general court martial and a dishonorable discharge from the Army of the United 
States, and there is trouble in this boy’s heart . . . and [trouble] has stayed in his 
heart . . . after he got back home to Groveland”). 
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Victory or Tragedy? 
After two trials and two sets of appeals, the NAACP had spent 
nearly $50,000 on the defense of the Groveland case,349 nearly ten 
times the amount spent by Lake County to prosecute it. The NAACP 
had little to show for their efforts. Two defendants were dead, one had 
been sentenced to death twice, and one was currently serving his life 
sentence. Groveland was short on results, but long on impact. Few 
trials can match the chaos, fear, violence, bigotry, and drama of the 
Groveland case. In all of American legal history, only three or four 
racially motivated trials can even claim peer status with the Groveland 
trial. In this respect, Groveland takes its place next to such infamous 
racial prosecutions as Leo Frank, 350  Sacco and Vanzetti, 351 and 
Scottsboro.352 Yet, while Groveland is every bit the historical equal of 
these legal giants, it is by far the least well known. 
What then are the morals of this great but forgotten case? Should 
Groveland be viewed as a victory or a failure of the United States legal 
system? Overwhelmingly, the current historiography paints Groveland 
                                                
349 CORSAIR, supra note 7, at 347. 
350 See THE LEO FRANK CASE RESEARCH LIBRARY, www.leofrank.org (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2016). The Leo Frank Trial involved the 1915 Georgia prosecution of a 
Jewish businessman in Atlanta for the murder of a thirteen year-old girl at the 
factory he ran. After his conviction on thin evidence, Frank was sentenced to 
death. However, his sentence was later commuted to life by the Georgia 
governor. In response to the governor’s decision, Frank was kidnapped from the 
Georgia state prison and lynched. The case, and the men responsible for the 
lynching, led to a revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the south. 
351 See Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1927), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1927/03/the-case-of-sacco-and-
vanzetti/306625/. The Sacco and Vanzetti Trial involved the 1920 
Massachusetts prosecution of two Italian immigrants for the alleged armed 
robbery and murder of two clerks. Convicted on scant evidence and sentenced to 
death, they were electrocuted in 1927. The Massachusetts government 
eventually exonerated the two men of all criminal acts some fifty years later. 
352 See Daren Salter, Scottsboro Trials, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ALABAMA (Nov. 21, 
2013), http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1456. The Scottsboro 
Trials involved the 1931 Alabama prosecution of nine black boys for the alleged 
rape of two white women while on a train from Chattanooga, Tennessee into 
northeastern Alabama. After a local lynch mob was held off by the National 
Guard, the boys were hastily convicted and sentenced to death. Three appeals 
and four trials later, the verdicts never changed. Eventually all nine were 
pardoned by the governor of Alabama. 
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as a failure, “a legal lynching,”353 and “a tragedy of the American 
South.”354 In a practical sense, it surely was. But could the argument 
not be made for victory? Thurgood Marshall says it was. While 
racism, hatred, and bigotry exist in all corners of the globe, it was 
America’s unique constitutional system that ended the Groveland saga 
with the proper result. Walter Irvin’s successful appeal resulted in a 
second trial and a stay of his execution, and both he, and Charles 
Greenlee, were ultimately released from prison having been pardoned 
by the governor. Only in a legal system founded on a multi-
jurisdictional appellate process, one that encompasses both federal and 
state machinery, would these results be possible. That system is then 
woven into our three-branch system of constitutional government, 
each with a measure of checks and balances upon the other. Only 
through this unique, multi-level form of legal restraint could justice 
have been ensured. While certainly too long and too costly in the 
making, could it not be said that the end result of the Groveland case 
was a win for justice, and a win for the American system of 
jurisprudence? Groveland’s historiography remains silent on this point, 
but its transcripts and court files scream to be heard on the matter. 
Or, if we are to assume, as Groveland’s historiography always has, 
that Groveland was indeed a legal failure, then who is to blame for this 
tragedy? The number of possible scapegoats is many. Blame could 
equally be assigned to any of several parties, or at the feet of the 
community as a whole. The Groveland story is ripe with conniving 
victims, racist sheriffs, dishonest deputies, partial prosecutors, closed-
minded jurors, and a community built on prejudice. Perhaps Judge 
Futch is less to blame than the history books might say. 
We may also be wise to look for a new middle ground when we 
look at Groveland. While much of Groveland’s story took place in the 
glare of the public forum, two of Groveland’s turning points took place 
on desolate, darkened roads, far from any objective witnesses. What 
happened on Florida State Roads 50 and 19 may never be known, but 
the truth generally lies somewhere between the two extremes we find 
on the record. Criminal cases are rarely as simple as total innocence, or 
total guilt. Perhaps Walter Irvin and Samuel Shepherd did commit 
some offense that night on State Road 50. Perhaps they did make the 
Padgett’s victims of something –carjacking, robbery, harassment? 
                                                
353 See generally CORSAIR, supra note 7. 
354 Lawson, supra note 12, at 25. 
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What of the fact that Willie Padgett might have found out that one of 
the Groveland Four was his wife’s lover, and the rape story was a 
simple cover-up? Maybe she had taken another black man as her 
lover? Maybe Willie had taken to violence against her again? And 
maybe Irvin and Shepherd did try to escape from Sheriff McCall when 
he pulled his car onto the side of State Road 19? Like the darkened and 
cloudy skies that often cover the central Florida geography, this is a 
story likely made of several shades of gray. While legal analysis is 
always more comfortable working in the shadows of uncertainty, the 
historiography of Groveland has yet to consider the fact that perhaps 
neither side is telling the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Until it 
does, the study of Groveland will remain a silent witness. 
Natural Causes 
Since 1952, sixty-three planting seasons have come and gone in 
Lake County, and the vast orange groves have continued on nature’s 
cycle, unaffected by the ghosts of the Groveland trials. Even as history 
marched on, the Groveland saga continued to resurface. Walter Irvin’s 
death sentence was commuted to Life in prison by Florida governor 
LeRoy Collins in 1954. While announcing the commutation, Governor 
Collins also took time to denounce the NAACP’s handling of the 
case.355 The decision angered Judge Futch to such an extent that he 
empaneled a Lake County grand jury to investigate Governor Collins 
on suspicion of his being a communist. While his legal authority to 
seek such a grand jury probe may be questioned, Judge Futch said the 
governor’s acts were subject to review by God and the people of 
Florida.356 Somewhat comically, the grand jury concluded that Collins’ 
commutation of the sentence was an honest gubernatorial mistake, but 
returned no indictment as to any criminal acts.357 In 1956, Governor 
Collins and his wife rode in a campaign parade in Eustis where they 
were accosted by Lake County sheriff’s deputies and Norma Lee 
Padgett. Norma Lee screamed at the governor, and asked him if his 
decision would have been the same had his wife been the victim.358 
She and Willie Padgett divorced in 1958.359 
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Judge Truman G. Futch died in March of 1960, and the news of his 
death was covered in The New York Times.360 A quick summary of the 
Groveland story formed the lead topic in the article. 361  Charles 
Greenlee was paroled in 1962, and Walter Irvin was paroled in 1968. 
One month later, upon returning to Lake County for the first time in 
nearly 18 years, Walter Irvin was found dead in his vehicle. Having 
spent the last 20 years in custody, he had been back within the borders 
of Lake County for only a few hours. Sheriff McCall declared Irvin’s 
death one of natural causes. Even McCall’s most ardent supporters 
found such a coincidence alarming.362 
Published at his ranch outside Umatilla six years before his death, 
even Willis McCall’s own autobiography contains only one chapter 
detailing his version of the Groveland narrative.363  In the Umatilla 
church that housed his 1994 funeral, the seating conditions were 
standing room only,364 and the city of Orlando’s chief of police served 
as a pallbearer.365 Before his death, McCall said “[he] never killed 
anyone who didn’t deserve killing.”366 In the 1980’s, by unanimous 
vote, the Lake County commission renamed Lake County Road 450A, 
Willis V. McCall Road.367 In October of 2007, by unanimous vote, the 
Lake County commission removed McCall’s name from County Road 
450A.368 
Currently, other than the laws that governed its proceedings, much 
of the Groveland story sits unaffected by time. Two other members of 
the Futch family have served as judges in Florida’s fifth circuit. 
Despite a reward for information and several state and federal 
investigations, Harry T. Moore’s assassination is still one of Florida’s 
great, unsolved cold cases. Charles Greenlee is still alive, but he lives 
far from Groveland, and he has not stepped foot in Lake County since 
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his conviction date.369 To this day, there is no reference, by sign or 
memorial, of these events in Lake County. 370  With the courtroom 
adjourned, Groveland is still searching for its voice. 
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